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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1952 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code' con-
tained in section 4-303(1)(d) what was then called the "omnibus"
language.2 The language of this omnibus clause in that text and all
subsequent texts3 has remained unchanged as follows: "or other-
wise has evidenced by examination of such indicated account and
* Associate professor, Campbell University School of Law; B.A., J.D., Wash-
ington & Lee University. From 1971 to 1978, he was a partner in the firm of
Tiffany, Tiffany & Lewis in Warrenton, Virginia.
1. The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws promulgated this text in September of 1951 with the
endorsement of the American Bar Association.
2. U.C.C. § 4-303, comment 3.
3. There have been five official texts since the first one of 1952: the 1957
Official Text, the 1958 Official Text, the 1962 Official Text, the 1972 Official Text,
and the 1977 Official Text.
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by action its decision to pay the item .... ,4
According to the official comments to section 4-303, this omni-
bus clause describes one of the seven events' listed in section 4-303
which confer priority to an itemO over any knowledge, notice or
stop order received by, legal process served upon, or set-off exer-
cised by a payor bank. Comment 3 to section 4-303 says simply
that the omnibus clause was necessary to pick up other possible
types of action, impossible to specify particularly, when the bank
has examined the account to see if there are sufficient funds and
has taken some action indicating an intention to pay. "Sight post-
ing" is given as an illustration of this type of action.
In the years after the promulgation of the 1952 official text,
particularly as the New York Law Revision Commission studied
it, 7 and as more and more states either studied the Code for enact-
ment or actually enacted it during the late 1950's and early 1960's,
law professors, practicing attorneys and bank attorneys com-
mented on each provision of it. Section 4-303(1)(d) and its omni-
bus clause did not escape this scrutiny. Many of the commentators,
however, did no more than describe the purpose of section 4-303's
priority rules,' point out that section 4-213(1)(c), a remarkably
similar section in the Code,9 did not contain the omnibus clause,
and then note the purpose of the omnibus clause as explained in
official comment 3. Other commentators noted that the interplay
between section 4-213(1)(c)'s completion of the process of posting
and the omnibus clause of section 4-303(1)(d) left a period of time
or "gap" during which the responsibility of the payor bank was not
clearly defined. ' This period of questionable responsibility was
4. U.C.C. § 4-303(1)(d).
5. The omnibus clause is the sixth event. U.C.C. § 4-303, comment 3. Section
4-303(1)(e) is the seventh and last event. U.C.C. § 4-303, comment 4.
6. Item is defined as any instrument for the payment of money even though
not negotiable, but does not include money. U.C.C. § 4 -10 4 (l)(g).
7. The New York Law Revision Commission studied the official 1952 text
during the years 1953 through 1955.
8. As will be explained later, the 1952 Official Text and earlier drafts stated
the events of section 4-303 in terms of priority, but the 1957 official text and later
texts, as a result of the work of the New York Law Revision Commission, re-
moved the terminology of "priority" from the language of section 4-303. The pri-
ority terminology was left untouched, however, in the official code comments.
9. The similarities and dissimilarities of sections 4-213 and 4-303 will be
noted later on pages 287-88 infra.
10. Rapson, Article 4-Bank Deposits and Collections, 17 RUTGERs L. REv. 79
(1962); Bunn, When is a Check Paid? Check Handling Under Article 4 of the
[Vol. 4:279
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noted as early as January 15, 1954, by Robert H. Brome. 1' In a
memorandum which he filed with the New York Law Revision
Commission, Brome posed the problem:
If before posting but after ... evidencing its decision to pay
short of posting, the bank receives a stop order, what is the basis
of the bank's liability if it recognized the stop order and returns
the item as unpaid within the time permitted by sections 4-301
and 4-302? It would appear that there is none. 2
Walter D. Malcolm, the final recorder for U.C.C. Article 4, in a
February 17, 1954, reply letter to Brome's memorandum, acknowl-
edged that the case Brome posed had "theoretical difficulty." But
he added without further comment, "Query-how frequently will
they arise in contested cases?" 8 Brome's reply to Malcolm was
prophetic:
... I think banks will be faced fairly frequently with the
problems--do we give effect to the customer's stop order, and re-
turn the item to the holder and risk a possible test suit under the
statute, or do we give priority to the item and argue with the cus-
tomer as to how far we had gone in the posting process?' 4
Despite the questions about the omnibus clause raised by
Brome, the New York Law Revision Commission suggested no
change in the omnibus language.' 5 The language has, as set out
above, remained unchanged since the 1952 official text. Time, how-
ever, has answered Malcolm's query by confirming Brome's feeling
that the problem would indeed surface frequently.
Uniform Commercial Code., 43 MINN. L. Rav. 289 (1958); Russell, Article 4: Bank
Deposits and Collections, 29 Mo. L. Rav. 411 (1964); note that all of these law
review articles are pre-1968--before the West Side case brought this "gap" to
light.
11. Chairman of the Subcommittee on Bank Deposits and Collections of the
New York State Bar Association's Special Committee to consider the Uniform
Commercial Code and also member of the Special Committee of Federal Reserve
Counsel to consider the Uniform Commercial Code.
12. 1 Naw YORK LAw REvmioN COMMSSION REPORT 297 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
13. Id. at 342.
14. Id. at 362.
15. 1 CoMwssoN REPORT 429 (1956). As discussed later in this article, the
analysis of section 4-303 by John D. Killian, HI, Esq., may have softened Mr.
Brome's fears by reporting that New York's law was in accord with the acts by
which section 4-303 gives the item priority. See 2 CombssIoN REPORT 252 (1955).
19821 281
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A. THE PROBLEM FIRST ARISES, BUT IN DISGUISE
The facts in the now famous case of West Side Bank v.
Marine National Exchange Bank" raised the issue posed by
Brome in his January 15, 1964, memorandum: is a payor bank17
accountable to the holder' s of a check if it has, under section 4-
303(1)(d)'s omnibus clause, evidenced by examination of its cus-
tomer's account and by action its decision to pay the check but has
not yet committed any of the final payment steps (particularly
that of completing the posting process) under section 4-213(1)?
The Wisconsin Supreme Court however, did not see that issue as
the controlling one and decided the case without mentioning sec-
tion 4-303 or its omnibus clause.
In the West Side case, the stock brokerage firm of Paine,
Webber had issued a check in the amount of $262,600.00, drawn on
Marine National Bank, to the order of Byron Swidler. That same
day, Bryon Swidler deposited the check in his account at West
Side Bank. On Friday morning, West Side Bank, through the local
clearinghouse, presented the check to Marine National for pay-
ment. On Friday evening, Marine National sent the check, along
with others, through its sorting and encoding machines and its
electronic computer. Since the electronic computer did not reveal
that Paine, Webber's account was deficient in any respect the ac-
count was charged with the item and a "Paid" stamp was affixed to
the check. On Monday morning, the report of the computer was
submitted to the bookeeper, and since the computer had revealed
no deficiencies, the item was photographed, cancelled and filed in
Paine, Webber's account.
16. 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968). The trial court's written opinion
in the same case quoted section 4-303(1)(d) and recognized the period of ques-
tionable responsibility suggested by Brome: "The possibility has been suggested
that a payor bank may make a discretionary determination of payment in the
period occurring between charging an account and reversing an entry when one of
the 'four legals' intervenes." West Side Bank v. Marine National Exchange
Bank, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Ser. 264, 273 (Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Co., 1967). Nevertheless,
the trial court did not decide the question under section 4-303 because it felt the
issue under section 4-303 was not presented; the Wisconsin Supreme Court later
affirmed the holding of the trial court in its famous opinion.
17. "Payor bank" means a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or
accepted. U.C.C. § 4-105(b).
18. "Holder" means a person who is in possession of a document of title or
an instrument or a certificated investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to
him or his order or to bearer or in blank. U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
[Vol. 4:279
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If the story had ended with the actions of the bookkeeper, no
one, not even law students and bank attorneys, would have heard
anything more about the West Side case. Unfortunately, at 4:00
p.m., on that same Monday, Marine National discovered that a
check drawn by Swidler on another bank in the amount of
$270,000.00 payable to Paine, Webber and deposited by it in its
account at Marine National, had been dishonored as a nonsuf-
ficient fund check. Upon learning of these facts from Marine Na-
tional, Paine, Webber immediately entered a stop payment order
with Marine National on its check for $262,600.00 payable to
Bryon Swidler. Marine National withdrew the check from Paine,
Webber's file and notified West Side Bank that the check for
$262,600.00, which it had presented to Marine National in the
clearinghouse on Friday, was being returned because of the stop
payment order. Marine National reversed the entries for the check
in the computer that same Monday night by crediting Paine, Web-
ber and stamping the check, "Payment Stopped" and "Cancelled
in Error." Marine National then returned the check to West Side
Bank in the morning exchange at the clearinghouse on Tuesday.
West Side sued Marine National Bank for the face amount of the
dishonored check.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin's opinion based on these
facts, either set out in full or discussed in most commercial law
case books, is now history. In short, it held that Marine National
Bank was not accountable for the amount of the check to West
Side Bank because the process of posting, which would have
brought about accountability under section 4-213(1)(c), had never
been completed.1' The court never mentioned section 4-303 even
though the facts included a contest between a customer's stop pay-
ment order and a check holder's demand for payment and West
Side Bank's brief advanced the argument that the stop payment
order came too late under the omnibus clause of section 4-303 for
Marine National to honor it instead of the check. 0
19. Marine National Bank convinced the court that its process of posting in-
cluded section 4-109(e)'s correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action until
it was too late to return the check, thus effectively postpoing the completion of its
posting process until cut off by section 4-213(1)(d)'s midnight deadline or later
time provided by statute, clearinghouse rule or agreement.
20. Brief for Appellant at 24, West Side Bank v. Marine Natl Exch. Bank, 37
Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968) (hereinafter cited West Side Brief).
1982] 283
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B. THE BATTLE LiEs ARE DRAWN
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not address the
issue of whether section 4-303's omnibus clause could impose ac-
countability in the West Side case, legal commentators did not
miss an opportunity to discuss it. Walter D. Malcolm, the final re-
porter for Article 4, suggested outright that section 4-303, rather
than section 4-213, should have been the section used to determine
the outcome of the West Side case; therefore West Side Bank
should have prevailed as a result because the stop order came too
late for Marine National to obey it.2 1 James J. White and Robert
S. Summers, authors of the popular treatise, HANDBOOK ON THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, agree with Malcolm that the Wiscon-
sin court was in error in analyzing the case under section 4-213 and
not under section 4-303(1)(d) as a priority dispute.22 On the other
hand, Fairfax Leary, Jr., the initial reporter of Article 4, main-
tained that section 4-303 could not have been used by a holder
such as West Side Bank to impose accountability on a payor bank
such as Marine National." In a frequently cited article, Ralph J.
Rohner conceded that a payor bank which had otherwise evi-
denced its decision to pay but had not yet completed the posting
process was not yet liable to the holder." Two law review notes
also agreed.2
21. Malcolm, Reflections on West Side Bank: A Draftsman's View, 18 CATH.
U. L. REV. 23, 31 (1968).
22. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 559 (2d ed. 1980). The authors' views have been the same
since it was first taken in their earlier edition of the same book. J. WmrE AND R.
SUMMERS, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
599 (1972). In their casebook, which they co-authored with Richard E. Speidel,
their discussion of section 4-303 priority dispute asserts that the "importance of
analyzing a priority dispute under U.C.C. section 4-303 and not merely with
U.C.C. section 4-213 can make the difference between winning and losing a
$262,000 law suit," an obvious reference to their opinion that the West Side case
should have been analyzed under section 4-303 and not U.C.C. § 4-213. R. SPF-
DEL, R. SUMMERS, AM) J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 1418 (3rd ed.
1981).
23. Leary, supra note 10, at 364; Leary, Reflections on Articles 3 and 4, 48
TEMP. L. Q. 919, 929 (1975).
24. Rohner, Posting of Checks: Final Payment and the Four Legals, 23 Bus.
LAW. 1075, 1087 (1968). Malcolm even cites this article in 18 CATH. U. L. REv. 23,
but not for this proposition!
25. Note, 9 B.C. INDUS. AND COM. L. REv. 957, 966 n. 79 (1968); Note, 43 Mo.
L. REv. 734, 742 (1978).
[Vol. 4:279
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What is the true place and purpose of section 4-303's omnibus
language? The answer is not yet clear; the law in this area, in the
words of the authors of one textbook, 2 has not yet crystalized.
Commentators have expressed their opinions, given brief reasons,
and then have gone on to other issues, perhaps more important
and timely. The omnibus clause has never been dealt with in
depth; a glancing blow at best has been given-a lick and a
promise.
The purpose of this article is to give the omnibus clause more
than a lick and a promise-a solid treatment. It will examine not
only the present day language of the omnibus clause and section 4-
303 in which it appears, but also its pre-Code existence, its pre-
legislative history, its legislative history, the views of legal com-
mentators, and possible future treatment by the courts.
II. THE STARTING POINT
The starting point for discussion of whether the omnibus
clause of section 4-303 may be used by a holder to impose account-
ability on a payor is to look at those provisions which, without
question, do impose accountability in favor of a holder against a
payor bank. The possibility of section 4-303's omnibus clause also
imposing accountability will then come more sharply into focus.
The most obvious section by which a holder may impose liabil-
ity 27 on a payor bank is section 3-413(1) under which an acceptor
engages that he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at
the time of his engagement. If a payor banks thus becomes an ac-
ceptor of a check by certifying it,28 the holder may sue the payor
bank on the check if it does not honor its acceptor's contract."
A holder of a check may impose accountability on a payor
bank if that bank makes any of the final payment steps under sec-
tion 4-213(1). For example, if the payor bank settles for the item
26. R. BRAUCHER AND R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSAC-
TIONS, 130 (1972).
27. The term "liability" is used here with section 3-413(1) because the
holder's suit against the payor bank will be based on the check itself. "Accounta-
bility" is used with the acts under section 4-213 because those acts, once they
have taken place, impose a duty to account since payment has presumably al-
ready been made. See U.C.C. § 4-213, comment 7.
28. Id. §§ 3-410(1), 3-411(1).
29. Of course, if the payor bank does not accept the check by certification, it
will not be liable on it to the holder since the payor "is not liable on the instru-
ment until he accepts it." Id. § 3-409(1).
1982]
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without reversing the right to revoke, 0 if it completes the process
of posting," or if it gives provisional credit and fails to revoke the
settlement in the time and manner permitted,32 then the payor
bank "shall be accountable for the amount of the item. 3 3
Although section 4-213(1) lists payment in cash as one of the
final payment steps," it does not provide that the payor bank is
accountable after the payment of cash. Comment 7 to section 4-
213, however, explains that the payor bank is not made accounta-
ble if it has paid the item in cash because such payment is itself a
sufficient accounting. The payor bank, thus, has accounted for the
check by paying for it in cash.
Section 4-302, entitled "Payor Bank's Responsibility for Late
Returns" is yet another provision by which accountability may be
imposed by a holder upon a payor bank. If a payor bank, which is
not also a depositary bank,3' retains a check beyond midnight of
the banking day of receipt without settling for it, that payor bank
will become accountable for the amount of the check to the
holder.3 ' Regardless of whether the payor bank is also the deposi-
tary bank, if it does not pay or return the check or send notice of
dishonor until after the midnight deadline, it is also accountable
for the amount of the check to the holder.37
The only other section that clearly imposes liability in favor of
a holder upon a payor bank is section 3-419(1) which makes a
payor liable in conversion. If, for example, the payor bank refuses
to return a check delivered to it for acceptance 3 or refuses on de-
mand either to pay or return the check delivered for payment 3 or
30. Id. § 4-213(1)(b).
31. Id. § 4-213(l)(c).
32. Id. § 4-213(l)(d).
33. Id. § 4-213(1).
34. Id. § 4-213(1)(a).
35. A depositary bank is the first bank to which an item is transferred for
collection even though it is also the payor bank; in this case, however, the deposi-
tary bank is not the payor bank. U.C.C. § 4-302(a) (emphasis added).
36. U.C.C. § 4-302(a). In other words, the payor bank must make the "au-
thorized settlement" required under section 4-301(1) before midnight of the bank-
ing day of receipt if it is to avoid accountability to the holder. Section 4-301(2)
does not require the "authorized settlement" of section 4-301(1) if the payor bank
is also the depositary bank. See section 4-301, comment 2. Section 4-105(a) pro-
vides that a depositary bank may also be a payor bank.
37. U.C.C. § 4-302(a).
38. Id. § 3-419(1)(a).
39. Id. § 3-419(1)(b).
[Vol. 4:279286
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pays over a forged indorsement,0 the payor bank may be liable on
the face amount of the instrument."
Should section 4-303 be added to the above list of provisions
which certainly act as swords in the hands of the holder in the
sense that they impose either liability or accountability upon the
payor bank? If section 4-303 were added to the list, it would, for
the most part, make no difference because the elements that trig-
ger either liability or accountability under sections 3-413(1), 4-213,
and 4-302, also appear in section 4-303. For example, acceptance or
certification which triggers liability under the acceptor's contract
of section 3-413(1) is also present in section 4-303(1)(a). In addi-
tion, section 4-213(1)'s final payment steps of paying the item in
cash, settling for the item without reserving the right to revoke and
completing the posting process appear verbatim in section 4-
303(1)(b),(c), and (d). Section 4-213(1)(d)'s making a provisional
settlement for the item and then failing to revoke it in the time
and manner permitted, and section 4-302's late returns which
bring about accountability on the part of the payor bank, are both
incorporated in section 4-303(1)(e). Therefore, arguing that section
4-303 is a sword in the hands of the holder to impose accountabil-
ity on the payor bank would appear on the surface to make little
difference, except for the inclusion of the omnibus clause, the lan-
guage of which appears nowhere else in the Code.
A. FIRST ANALYSIS
By comparing the language of section 4-303(1)(d), ' 2 with com-
parable language of section 4-213(1)(c)41 and the official comments
of both sections, it is easy to see that the omnibus clause of section
4-303(1)(d) must be something different from the completion of
the posting process mentioned at the beginning of section 4-
303(1)(d) and section 4-213(1)(c). If the omnibus clause were not
somehow different, surely the drafters would have included the ad-
ditional language." The difficult questions are how exactly is it dif-
40. Id. § 3-419(1)(c).
41. Id. § 3-419(2).
42. U.C.C. § 4-303(1)(d): "completed the process of posting the item to the
indicated account of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith or
otherwise has evidenced by examination of such indicated account and by action
its decision to pay to the item."
43. U.C.C. § 4-213(1)(c): "completed the process of posting the item to the
indicated account of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith."
44. Unless, of course, the drafters succumbed to the temptation to do what
1982] 287
9
Lewis: The Omnibus Clause of U.C.C. Section 4-303(1)(d): A Holder's Swor
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1982
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
ferent and what significance does it have?
The omnibus clause apparently describes an event that is
completely separate from the completion of the posting process
mentioned in section 4-213(1)(c) and in the first part of section 4-
303(1)(d). Comments 2 and 3 to section 4-303 support this proposi-
tion. Comment 3, for example, calls the event described by the om-
nibus clause as the "sixth event" conferring priority under section
4-303. The first five events are listed in comment 2 and include
acceptance, certification, payment in cash under section 4-
213(1)(a), final payment of the item under section 4-213(1)(b), and
completion of the process of posting under section 4-213(1)(c)."I
The omnibus clause, therefore, is recognized as an event that is
separate and different from completion of the posting process de-
scribed either under section 4-213(1)(c) or section 4-303(1)(d).
This different and separate event also apparently takes place
at a different point in time from that of completion of the posting
process. Surely it does not take place at the same time or after
completion of the posting process because, in that event, the draft-
ers would have had no reason to put in an additional event since
final payment and priority would have already been conferred by
the completion of the posting process. The event described by the
omnibus clause must therefore come at a point in time prior to
that of completion of the posting process. Legal commentators
agree on this point. For example, in his January 15, 1954, analysis
of section 4-303, Robert H. Brome stated in the beginning: "This
section provides, in effect, that there may be a period of time
before an item is finally paid during which the item nevertheless
has 'priority of payment' over the indicated items. '46 Legal com-
mentators have accepted this early proposition without question.1
What makes up the action described by the omnibus clause?
many lawyers do when they use such phrases as "null and void." H. WEmHOFEN,
LEGAL WRITING STYLE 50 (2d ed. 1980).
45. Comment 2 describes the third, fourth, and fifth events by referring to
section 4-213 because it says that certain of the tests determining priority status
are the same tests for determining final payment under section 4-213, an obvious
reference to the verbatim language of section 4-213(1)(a), (b) and (c) and section
4-303(1)(b), (c) and (d), except, of course, for the omnibus clause in section 4-
303(1)(d). Comment 4 of section 4-303 states that the seventh and last event is
the accountability resulting from section 4-213(1)(a) and 4-302 on late returns. 1
COMMISSION REPORT 305 (1954).
46. 1 COMMISSION REPORT 305 (1954).
47. Bunn, supra note 10, calls the event of the omnibus clause an "act short"
of final posting.
288 [Vol. 4:279
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Two elements seem to do it: (1) examination of the indicated ac-
count and (2) some additional action, both of which must evidence
a decision or an intention48 to pay. Comment 3 to section 4-303
states that the types of action making up the sixth event are im-
possible to specify particularly but occur "where the bank has (1)
examined the account to see if there are sufficient funds and (2)
has taken some action indicating an intention to pay." The exam-
ple given in comment 3, and included in most writings of the com-
mentators, is the action of sight posting in which the bookkeeper
(1) examines the account and (2) makes the decision to pay by
sight posting rather than actual posting. Both elements required
under the omnibus clause are certainly present in the bookkeeper's
action: (1) the examination of the account and (2) the additional
action, which, in this instance, is the posting by hand on the cus-
tomer's ledger sheet.
Could these two acts, examination and some additional action,
in the omnibus clause in any way be equated to the actions under
the process of posting? According to section 4-109,"' the process of
posting, like the omnibus clause, also contains two elements: (1)
determining to pay an item and (2) recording the payment."e The
major similarity between the process of posting and the omnibus
clause seems to be in their first elements. Although section 4-109
does not define what it means by its first element, "determining to
pay an item," comment 5 of section 4-213, which discusses the pro-
cess of posting,51 does describe what it calls the key point at which
the decision of the bank to pay is made."2 This key point (determi-
nation to pay, if you use the language of section 4-109) is when the
bookkeeper for the drawer's account determines or verifies that the
check is in good form and that there are sufficient funds in the
48. Although section 4-303(1)(d)'s omnibus clause speaks of "evidenced...
[a] decision" to pay, comment 3 to section 4-303(1)(d) uses the phrase "indicating
an intention to pay."
49. Section 4-109 which defines the process of posting did not appear in the
earlier texts of the Code; it was added in 1962.
50. "The 'process of posting' means the usual procedure followed by a payor
bank in determining to pay an item and in recording the payment.. " U.C.C. §
4-109.
51. When the comments of section 4-213 were drafted, section 4-109 was not
in existence. See supra note 48. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the
official comments of section 4-213 are a fertile area for ideas on the posting
process.
52. This "decision to pay" language of comment 5 seems similar enough to
equal it to section 4-109's "determining to pay" language.
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drawer's account to cover it." Since the first element of the omni-
bus clause is described as when the bank examines the account to
see if there are sufficient funds," it seems that the first element of
the process of postin 5 and the first element of the omnibus clause
are substantially the same.
The difference then, if there is one, must be in the second ele-
ment of the process of posting and the omnibus clause. The omni-
bus clause describes its second element as "some further action;""
the description of the second element of the process of posting is
"recording the payment." On the surface, these two elements
might be the same. Official comment 5 to section 4-213, in continu-
ing its discussion of the posting process, speaks of its second ele-
ment as some action beyond "a mere examination of the account of
the person to be charged," which is certainly only a part of the first
element of the posting process. Comment 5 terms that action the
"mechanical step" and says that it is "the posting of the item to
the account." Comment 3 to section 4-303 does not define what
"other further actions" might be in the omnibus clause, but it does
give as an example sight posting in which the bookkeeper
"postpones posting," suggesting that "other further actions" is
something short of the mechanical step of actual posting, and thus
something different from "recording the payment."
Section 4-303's comment 3 offers another example of "other
further action" when it says that the clause should be interpreted
in the light of Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First National Bank of
South Weymouth.57 In that case," a maker made a note payable to
a payee at the First National Bank of South Weymouth. Several
days prior to the note's maturity date, the holder of the note sent
it to the First National Bank after indorsing it, "for collection and
remittance," in order to have the note paid and the funds sent to
him.59 When the cashier of the bank received the note, he drew a
53. U.C.C. § 4-213, comment 5.
54. U.C.C. § 4-303, comment 3.
55. Id. §§ 4-213, 4-109.
56. Section 4-303(1)(d) actually states "action." This writer has taken the
liberty of adding the word "further" in order to differentiate the "action" of the
second element from the action taken in the first element when the bookkeeper
examines the account to see if there are sufficient funds.
57. 184 Mass. 49, 67 N.E. 670 (1903).
58. Although the Nineteenth Ward case is frequently cited in legal literature
on this point, few writers have ever examined its facts.
59. It might seem that this case would not be applicable to a check, but the
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check made payable to the holder on the bank's account with an-
other bank in Boston. He made a memo of the check and then
stamped the note paid and perforated it three times. He put the
note along with the check in a file "so that the proper record of the
transaction might be entered at the end of the day upon the per-
manent books."" The clerk, however, never made an entry on the
permanent books because he received a telephone call from the
maker's creditors who requested that the note not be paid because
an assignment had been made for their benefit. The clerk obeyed
the directions from the creditors and did not pay the note; the
holder of the note later sued the bank.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court decided that the First Na-
tional Bank of South Seymouth should not have obeyed the tele-
phone call, but rather should have paid the note by transferring
the proceeds on to the holder. It held that prior to the telephone
call the note had been paid and the only remaining duty of the
bank was to remit the proceeds. It added, "[it] is true the proper
records were to be made upon the books, but the payment is af-
fected by the act, and not by the record, and was valid even with-
out records." 61 Since the court held that payment was "affected by
the act" (stamping the note paid, perforating it and putting it in a
file), and not "by the record," the facts of the case would seem to
confirm that the second act in the completion of the posting pro-
cess, the mechanical act of posting to the account, need not occur
under the omnibus clause, but some action short of mechanical ac-
tion must occur, such as in this case the marking of the note
"paid" and the perforating of the note.62
court opinion notes that in Massachusetts a note payable at a bank is equivalent
to a check drawn upon that bank. 184 Mass. 49, 67 N.E. 670. This rule is reflected
today in Alternative A of section 3-122. The official comment to section 3-122 says
that Alternative A is common in the Northeastern states but not common in the
Southern and Western states.
60. 184 Mass. at 50, 67 N.E. at 671.
61. Id.
62. The judge writing the opinion in the Nineteenth Ward case speaks in
terms of "payment" of the note. As will be discussed later, pre-code cases deter-
mined priority by whether payment had been made. Since the note here had been
"paid," the stop payment order made by the maker's creditors did not have prior-
ity. Legal commentators have speculated about what acts short of the mechanical
step of posting would constitute the "other further actions" of the omnibus
clause. Some of the acts suggested are stamping the item paid after examination
even though the posting to the drawer's account has not occurred. Bunn, supra
note 10, at 301; Note, Bank Collections Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 38
1982]
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Comment 3 to Section 4-303 also states that the omnibus
clause was intended to include more than various preliminary acts
which are in "no way close to a true decision of the bank to pay
the item." It then lists, as examples, such preliminary acts as re-
ceiving the item over the counter for deposit, entry of a provisional
credit in the passbook, or the making of a provisional settlement
for the item through the clearinghouse, by entries in accounts, re-
mittance or otherwise. Since the two elements of section 4-303's
omnibus clause appear to be modified by the phrase "evidenced
. . . its decision to pay," then certainly none of these preliminary
acts which are in no way close to a true decision to pay would con-
stitute the action described by the omnibus clause. Naturally,
these same preliminary acts would also not constitute completion
of the posting process since the decision to pay is also a part of
that process.
Thus, this first analysis of the omnibus clause indicates that it
does indeed represent a prior separate event short of the posting
process under section 4-213(1)(c). If section 4-303 were then added
to the list of the Code provisions by which holders clearly impose
liability or accountability on a payor bank, it would make a great
deal of difference. As a prior separate event it would bring about
accountability for a payor bank when no other provision of the
Code would do so, thus making the omnibus clause, in effect, an
independent basis for accountability of the payor bank under the
Code.
The argument used by West Side Bank in its brief depended
on the omnibus clause's being a prior separate event short of the
posting process. West Side argued that even if the posting process
had not been completed, as the Wisconsin court eventually held,
Marine National had nevertheless under the omnibus clause "oth-
erwise [that is, not by the completion of the posting process] evi-
denced by examination.., and by action its decision to pay..."
Paine, Webber's check when it charged Paine, Webber's account,
and then stamped the check paid, checked for sufficient funds,
photographed and cancelled the check and finally filed it in the
IND. L. REv. 710, 728 (1963); assurance that a check is good to a teller who tele-
phones the bookkeeping department; Rapson, supra note 10, at 85; and the send-
ing of a remittance draft; Clark, Bank Deposits and Collections: Article IV, 16
ARK. L. REv. 45, 52 (1961), can be used by those who support Malcolm's view that
the omnibus clause can be used as a sword by a holder to impose liability on a
payor bank.
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drawer's file.63 Certainly West Side's argument that Marine Na-
tional's actions at least constituted the actions described by the
omnibus clause is a plausible one, but West Side's argument
needed an additional step: that Marine National was therefore ac-
countable for the amount of the check since the stop order came
too late for Marine National to honor it instead of paying the
check.
Unfortunately for West Side bank, section 4-303's language
does not include any words of "accountability" as does section 4-
213. It is difficult to argue that section 4-303(1)(d) imposes liability
by inference through section 4-213(1)(c) because of their similarity
in the light of section 4-303's omnibus clause being a prior separate
event which falls short of section 4-213(1)(c)'s posting process. The
actions constituting the omnibus clause of section 4-303 simply do
not occur under section 4-213, and thus accountability would not
seem to arise. The only other sections by which either accountabil-
ity or liability arise do not include the actions constituting the om-
nibus clause."' The omnibus clause under the first analysis would
not then impose liability or accountability in favor of a holder of a
check against a payor bank.
B. SEcoND ANALYSIS
In 1956, the American Law Institute and the National Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws accepted the recommendation
made by the New York Law Revision Commission" and changed
the preamble of section 4-303 as it appeared in the 1952 official
text." The new preamble,67 which has remained unchanged to
63. West Side Brief at 24-32.
64. U.C.C. §§ 4-213(1), 4-302, 4-213, and 4-319. See supra pp. 285-87.
65. "It was recommended that the language of the preamble to section 4-303
be revised to delete the phrase 'entitled to priority' and substitute language mak-
ing it clear that the section is concerned only with the question whether notice,
etc. 'comes too late."' 1 COMMISSION REPORTS 429 (1951).
66. The preamble as it appeared in the 1952 official text was as follows: "Any
notice, stop-order or legal process received and any valid set-off exercised by a
payor bank is entitled to priority over any item drawn on or payable by and re-
ceived by the bank until but not after the bank has done any of the follow-
ing. . . ." The remainder of section 4-303 in the 1952 text listed (a) through (e)
with a few changes not relevant to this discussion.
67. Any knowledge, notice or stop-order received by, legal process served
upon or set-off exercised by a payor bank, whether or not effective under
other rules of law to terminate, suspend or modify the bank's right or
duty to pay an item or to charge its customer's account for the item,
19821 293
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date, provides, in language simpler than that actually used, that
the four legals 8 come too late to terminate, suspend or modify the
payor bank's right or duty to pay an item or to charge its cus-
tomer's account if they come after the payor bank has made any of
the steps discussed in (a) through (e) of section 4-303."
Like the absence of accountability language in section 4-303,
the language of the preamble to section 4-303 may also have an
effect on whether section 4-303's omnibus clause may be used by a
holder to impose accountability on a payor bank. For example,
without even attempting to infer accountability from section 4-213,
West Side's counsel argued that Marine National Bank should not
have obeyed the stop payment order simply because under the pre-
amble's langauge it "came too late" when Marine National had
taken all the actions contemplated by the Code under the omnibus
clause. According to the argument, if a stop payment order or any
of the four legals come too late under section 4-303, then a check
simply has "priority" and the payor bank has no discretion under
section 4-303(1) to do anything other than pay the check to the
holder. 0
The counter argument is "But too late for what?" The pream-
ble provides that the legal comes too late to terminate, suspend or
modify the payor bank's "right or duty to pay the item." Assuming
that the stop payment order in the West Side case did indeed
comes too late to so terminate suspend or modify such right or duty if
the knowledge, notice, stop-order or legal process is received or served
and a reasonable time for the bank to act thereon expires or the set-off is
exercised after the bank has done any of the following...
U.C.C. § 4-303(1).
68. The four legals are, of course, knowledge or notice, stop orders, legal pro-
cess and set off to which a check may be subject under section 4-303.
69. (a) accepted or certified the item;
(b) paid the item in cash;
(c) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settle-
ment and without having such right under statute, clearing house
rule or agreement;
(d) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated ac-
count of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith
or otherwise has evidenced by examination of such indicated account
and by action its decision to pay the item; or
(e) become accountable for amount of the item under sub-section
(1)(d) of section 4-213 and section 4-302 dealing with the payor
bank's responsibility for late returns of items.
Id.
70. West Side Brief at 32, 38.
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come too late under the omnibus clause, then it follows under sec-
tion 4-303's preamble that it came too late to terminate or suspend
Marine National's "right or duty" to pay the amount of the check
to West Side.
Consider first Marine National's "right" to pay the check to
West Side, a "right" which West Side would argue was preserved
for Marine National since the stop payment order came in too late
to suspend that right. Exactly what the term "right" means in rela-
tion to what a payor bank, like Marine National, may or may not
do in paying the check is not suggested in the Code. One can only
reason that if a person has a right to do a certain act, that person
has the discretion whether to do the act or not. It seems illogical to
require a bank such as Marine National to exercise its right to pay
West Side if Marine National for any reason did not want to exer-
cise that right.
Next, consider Marine National's "duty" to pay the check to
West Side, a "duty" which West Side would argue was preserved
for Marine National since the stop payment order came in too late
to suspend that duty. As with the term "right," the Code is equally
silent about the meaning of "duty."72 Surely, it is something more
than a "right," and probably means the "requirement" or the "ob-
ligation" which "right" did not include. The stop payment order's
coming too late under the omnibus clause in the West Side case
then must mean that Marine National's duty or obligation or re-
quirement to pay the check to West Side was not terminated or
71. No help can be found in the official comments to 4-303 because no fur-
ther comments were added upon adoption of the "comes too late. . to terminate,
suspend or modify.. . the right or duty to pay. .. " language in 1956. The com-
ments of the New York Law Revision Commission in its 1956 report suggesting
the change in section 4-303's preamble are equally unhelpful. It was suggested
that the intention of this section is not to establish rules of priority, or determine
questions as to the validity or effectiveness of a notice, stop-order, legal process or
service, except to the extent that "priority" and effectiveness are determined by
the timeliness of receipt of the notice or stop-order, legal process or service, ex-
cept to the extent that "priority" and effectiveness are determined by the timeli-
ness of receipt of the notice or stop-order, service of process, or excercise of a set-
off- i.e. that the meaning of the section is that a notice, stop-order or legal pro-
cess which, under other rules of law, would be effective to terminate or suspend or
otherwise modify the bank's privilege to charge the customer's account for an
item it pays, and set-off which would, by other rules of law, be effective to termi-
nate or suspend the bank's duty to its customer to pay an item, "comes too late"
if the notice or order is received, or the process is served, or the set-off is exer-
cised, after the bank has done one of the things specified in section 4-303.
72. See supra note 71.
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suspended.
The non-termination or non-suspension of Marine National
Bank's duty to pay. would seem to be the strongest argument for
West Side Bank in seeking to require Marine National to pay it
the amount of the check. The weakness of that argument, however,
appears when one asks the question "to whom does the duty run?"
Certainly, a payor bank, like Marine National, has a duty to its
customer, Paine, Webber, to pay a properly payable check;73 but in
this case, its duty to its customer has surely been waived because
Paine, Webber issued a stop payment order.
Does the same duty to pay a check run also to its holder; in
this case, West Side Bank? No duty apparently exists under the
Code.7 ' If final payment, and thus accountability, had occurred
under section 4-213(1) or section 4-302, Marine National would
certainly have a duty to pay the check; but the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that no final payment occurred under those sections. If
Marine National Bank had accepted or certified the check, it
would have had an obligation to pay the check under section 3-413
(1); but no such acceptance or certification took place. Finally, if
Marine National Bank had refused to return the check delivered
either for acceptance or payment, or if it had paid over a forged
indorsement, then it would be liable for the amount of the check;7 5
but Marine National properly (according to the court) returned the
check through the Milwaukee clearinghouse. Thus, at least under
the Codee 6 no duty to pay the check would seem to run from
Marine National, the payor bank, to West Side, the holder of the
check.
If, however, the legal in the West Side case had been one
other than a stop payment order, such as legal process in a gar-
nishment action, notice of bankruptcy, or a bank setoff, and that
legal had come after the payor bank had taken the required actions
under the omnibus clause, the argument does not necessarily fol-
73. Section 4-402 on wrongful dishonor of a customer's check insures that a
payor bank will not lightly disregard its duty to its customer to pay a properly
payable check.
74. See supra note 71.
75. U.C.C. § 3-419(1).
76. One commentator has suggested that a payor bank might be held liable
under the Code's general obligation of good faith of section 1-203 or under a tort
theory using sections 4-103(5) and 1-103 to establish a standard of ordinary care
on the part of the payor bank in handling a check. Rohner, supra note 24, at
1087. Such theories have been criticized. See Leary, supra note 23, at 931.
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low that the payor bank in that case would have no duty to its
customer to pay the amount of the check to the holder. A waiver of
the payor bank's duty to pay for the customer may be easily in-
ferred from the customer's stop payment order, but not so from
any of the other legals." If a payor bank did in fact breach its duty
to a customer to pay a check by returning the check and honoring
one of the legals other than a stop payment order without approval
of its customer, and after it had taken the actions under the omni-
bus clause, to what liability or accountability would the payor
bank be subject? The customer could bring a cause of action
against the payor bank for wrongful dishonor of its check if suffi-
cient funds were in the account to pay the check.7 8 But the holder
of the check, a person or bank such as West Side, could not impose
liability or accountability against the payor bank unless the ac-
countability provision7 9 or the liability provisions80 of the Code had
come into play.
Under this second analysis, the omnibus clause again would
not impose liability or accountability in favor of the holder against
a payor bank as a result of the "right or duty" language of section
4-303's present preamble. If a payor bank has made a timely re-
turn of the check under section 4-301 and has not certified the
check, the payor bank would not be accountable to the holder even
if it obeyed a legal which came too late under the omnibus clause
because the payor's right or duty to pay the check do not seem to
run to the holder.
III. PRE-1952 HISTORY
Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code was not drafted in
a vacuum. The recorder had before him the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, adopted by every state then in the Union, and much
commercial case law construing both the Negotiable Instruments
Law and areas of commercial law not codified by the Negotiable
Instruments Law.81 In addition, the recorder had the benefit of ex-
77. Note, Final Payment and the Process of Posting Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 68 COLUM. L. Rsv. 349, 354.
78. U.C.C. § 4-402. Supra note 10, at 365. See supra note 71.
79. U.C.C. § 4-213(1) or 4-302.
80. U.C.C. § 3-413(1) or 3-419(1).
81. Actually, the sources before the records were a good deal more complex
than stated in this introduction to the pre-1952 history of section 4-303. See Mal-
colm, Article 4- A Battle with Complexity, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 265.
1982] 297
19
Lewis: The Omnibus Clause of U.C.C. Section 4-303(1)(d): A Holder's Swor
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1982
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
tensive consultation with others as the early drafts of the Code
were circulated among the experts. A look at this mixture of
sources from which the omnibus clause was born to take its final
form in the 1952 official text version will help to explain its place
and purpose today. The source of its pre-1952 history lies in two
places: first, pre-Code law and, secondly, what this writer terms
"pre-legislative" history.
A. PRE-CODE LAW IN DETERMINING PRIORITY
Whether a legal came too late to interfere with payment of a
check to a holder was determined under pre-Code law by the con-
cept of "payment".82 If "payment" occurred prior to the legal, then
the legal was ineffective to prevent payment; if, however, the legal
was received prior to "payment" then the legal prevented the pay-
ment.82 Unfortunately, exactly what brought about "payment"
prior to the Code's adoption was somewhat diverse;84 indeed, one
of the major contributions of Article 4 to the law of bank collec-
tions was to resolve exactly when an item was paid. 5
Despite the diversity in its concept, payment did come about
fairly quickly prior to World War II and the advent of deferred
posting. As Fairfax Leary, Jr., noted, two common law rules and a
third statutory rule emphasized speedy action in payment of a
check in the absence of deferred posting legislation." First, one
common law rule provided that the mere entry of credit in the de-
positor's passbook constituted final payment. 87 A second common
law rule, known as the "next day" rule, considered a person negli-
82. Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns-The Current Check Col-
lections Problems, 62 HARV. L. REV. 905, 946 (1946); Leary supra note 10, at 361.
83. The Nineteenth Ward case is a good example of pre-Code law. Once the
court in that case determined that payment had occurred before the stop pay-
ment order was received by telephone, it held that the stop payment order came
too late to prevent payment of the note.
84. The diversity in the "payment" concept is well documented and may be
conveniently summed up in Walter E. Malcolm's famous phrase, "yo pays yo
money, and yo takes yo choice." Malcolm, supra note 81, at 287. See also Mal-
colm, How Bank Collection Works, Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
11 How. L. J. 71, 81 (1965); Andrews, The City Clearing House: Payment, Re-
turns, and Reimbursement, 27 IND. L. J. 155, 158 (1952); Note supra note 25, at
959.
85. Malcolm, supra note 81, at 287.
86. Leary, supra note 10, at 334.
87. Unless, of course, there was an agreement to the contrary. See Andrews,
supra note 84, at 163-6. Note, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 802, 818 (1950).
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gent if he received a check drawn and payable in the same town
and did not present it for payment on the next banking day. If the
check were payable in a different town, he was considered negli-
gent if he did not start it on its way through the collection chan-
nels by the next banking day. The third rule, a statutory one as
interpreted by the courts, provided that a payor bank's retention
of a check payable by it beyond twenty-four hours rendered the
bank liable on it." The combination of these three rules worked
together to bring about payment on a check at a very early stage
under pre-Code law.' 9 Since the cut-off time for any of the four
legals came at the very same time as payment on the check, a de-
termination of whether a legal was too late to prevent payment
also came at a very early stage. Once the check was paid, the
holder of the check did not need to worry about one of the four
legals interfering with its payment.
Deferred posting legislation, which came about after World
War II, delayed the time of final payment on the check.'0 These
statutes extended the time within which a bank might return a not
good item, presumably giving the bank sufficient time in which to
provide for the orderly processing of checks."9 Most of the statutes
allowed a payor bank until midnight of the next business day after
receipt of the check in order to return it.'2
88. N.I.L. sections 136 and 137 were used by some courts to impose liability
on the payor banks for retention of a check beyond twenty-four hours. Leary,
supra note 82, at 918; Andrews, supra note 84, at 180.
89. In the ordinary clearinghouse arrangement prior to deferred posting stat-
utes, a payor bank which received checks at the morning exchange would return
the "not good" items in an afternoon exchange at two or three o'clock, so that in
practice a payor bank held checks about five hours. Leary, supra note 82, at 911.
90. Deferred posting was born of wartime shortage in personnel and the in-
creased volume of checks in the collection system. See Leary, supra note 82, at
906, 908. It has been defined as "a practice whereby all checks received by a payor
bank on one business day are accumulated and 'posted' to the ledger accounts of
the drawers at one time during the next day, as contrasted with the practice of
'dribble posting' whereby checks are posted from time to time during the day of
receipt." Brome, Bank Deposits and Collections, 16 LAw. & CoNTEMI. PROB., 308,
321 (1951).
91. The reason for permitting deferred posting was to cut down the number
of clerks necessary to handle the checks; with deferred posting, a bank could or-
ganize its work flow on a more even keel. See Leary, supra note 82, at 931. For a
practical view of the problems prevented by the adoption of deferred posting, see
Leary supra note 82, at 916. See also, Andrews, supra note 84, at 161, 180.
92. The American Banker's Association also drafted in 1948 a model deferred
posting statute which gave the drawee bank this same period to return a check.
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The deferred posting statutes thus extended the time period
during which a drawee bank could make a decision to pay or re-
turn the check. Since a drawee bank under a deferred posting stat-
ute would ordinarily post its checks on the day after receipt, its
decision to pay could be postponed until after the twenty-four
hour period formerly permitted.9s
The deferred posting statutes, however, did not change the
rule that the time of payment determined the effectiveness of the
four legals. Therefore, by postponing the time of payment and thus
extending the much needed time to the payor bank for its decision
to pay or return the check, the deferred posting statutes effectively
extended the time during which one of the four legals could inter-
fere with payment of a check and also increased the risk to the
holder of a check that a legal might prevent him from getting
payment."
Such was the state of pre-Code law on priority when the re-
corder began work on the Code. The official comment to section 4-
303 notes bleakly that the recorder had no prior uniform statutory
provision to use as a model for section 4-303.
B. PRE-LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The drafting history of the Uniform Commercial Code ordina-
rily begins with the 1952 official text of the Code because prior
drafts were not approved by the American Law Institute or the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws."s
An examination of the prior drafts beginning in 1949, however,
provides a background for the. birth of section 4-303's omnibus
clause and suggests something about its significance."
Andrews, supra note 84, at 181. Regulation J of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and the circulars of its Federal Reserve Banks were
amended, effective January 1, 1949, to recognize the practice of deferred posting.
Brome, supra note 90, at 321.
93. See supra note 7.
94. Leary, supra note 82, at 947; Leary, supra note 10, at 337, 362. Note,
supra note 25, at 958.
95. W. WInR, E. HART & R. DESmiERO, 6 U.C.C. REPORTER-DIGEST 1-3
(1981).
96. Pre-legislative history of the Uniform Commercial Code may not be a
valid tool to interpret its provisions. Section 1-102(3)(g) of the 1952 edition of the
Code provided that "[p]rior drafts of text and comments may not be used to as-
certain legislative intent." The explanation given for this provision was that
"[f]requently matters have been omitted as being implicit without statement and
language has been changed or added solely for clarity. The only safe guide to
300 [Vol. 4:279
22
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss2/2
THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE
The first integrated draft of the Code was published and
promulgated in May of 1949. 9 The forerunner of the present sec-
tion 4-303 was found in section 3-629(1) 91 and provided as follows:
Subject to the payor bank's right to charge the items received in a
single day in any order convenient to it, an item properly payable
when received takes priority for payment over all subsequently
received stop-orders, notices, or legal process, except that items
payable through the bank may, upon direction of the drawee, be
returned dishonored before expiration of the time allowed for re-
turn of such an item and recovery of its payment."
This first draft of the Code thus ended the drawer's power to
enter an effective stop order against a check at the time when the
check was received by the payor bank. Similarly, a creditor's power
to give a notice or have legal process served in order to interfere
with payment of a check also ended when the check was received
by the payor bank.
Section 3-629, unlike present section 4-303, omits any refer-
ence to a bank's set-off. The 1949 draft, however, provides for the
contest between a check and a set-off in section 3-414(4):
A payor bank may charge against the indicated account of its cus-
tomer the items received in a single day and in any order conve-
nient to the bank, but must charge all properly payable items re-
ceived on any one day before charging items on a subsequent day.
A demand on unmatured claim against its customer which the
bank calls or accelerates for set-off against his account has the
intent lies in the final text and comments." U.C.C. § 1-103(3)(g), comment (1952
version). Section 1-102(3)(g) however, was deleted in the 1957 edition of the Code
after the New York Law Revision Commission suggested that it should be de-
leted. The actual reason given for the deletion was that the changes from the 1952
edition were clearly legitimate history which may or may not suggest that pre-
1952 changes are still not legitimate history. White and Summers list prior drafts
as an aid to interpretation and construction of the Code, but warn that "lawyers
cannot base reliable inferences as to intended meaning of enacted text on changes
made from prior versions of that text." U.C.C. § 4 (2d ed. 1980). J. WHrTE AND R.
SuMMER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4
(2d ed. 1980).
97. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 798, 800 (1958). This draft was published for study purposes and
not recommended for adoption by the states. W. WILLER, F. HART & R. DESDERo,
6 U.C.C. REPORTER-DIGEST 1-3 (1981).
98. A separate Article 4 on Bank Deposits and Collections did not yet exist.
Part 6 of the Article in the 1949 draft was entitled, "Bank Collections."
99. U.C.C. § 3-629(1) (1949 version).
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effect of an item received on the day of the call or acceleration.'" °
Under this section, the cut-off time for a bank's set-off is extended
past the cut-off time for a stop order, notice or legal service under
section 3-629. The cut-off time for the set-off is, apparently, the
end of the banking day; the cut-off time for the stop order, notice
or legal service is the arrival of the check at the payor bank.
A comparison of the cut-off times for the four legals under the
1949 draft and under present-day section 4-303 reveals that the
cut-off times under the 1949 draft will generally come before the
cut-off time for the same four legals under section 4-303. Section 4-
303, of course, provides for a cut-off for all four legals as early as
acceptance, certification, or payment in cash but the cut-off can
come as late as the completion of the posting process under section
4-303(1)(d) or the midnight deadline under section 4-303(1)(e).
The cut-off time for the stop order, notice or legal service under
section 3-629 of the 1949 draft can come no later than the time
when the check is received by the payor bank; the cut-off time for
the bank's set-off will come no later than the end of the banking
day on which the check is received. Thus, the cut-off time for the
stop order, notice or legal process under the 1949 draft may come
as much as thirty-nine's' hours prior to the cut-off time for the
same legals under the present section 4-303, and the cut-off time
for the set-off under the 1949 draft as early as twenty-four hours
prior to the cut-off time of the set-off under section 4-303.
The comments to section 3-629102 suggest that the purpose of
the earlier cut-off times of the 1949 draft was to narrow the risk of
loss to the holder of the check by giving the check priority over
those legals. Fairfax Leary, Jr., the initial drafter of Article 4, has
confirmed this purpose.103 Although he was writing about an even
earlier draft of the Code than the 1949 draft,110 his comments are
still apropo to its provisions.
100. Id. § 3-414(4).
101. If the check arrives at the payor bank at 9:00 A.M. on Monday morning,
thirty-nine hours will pass before the midnight deadline on Tuesday.
102. Comment 1 to § 3-629. U.C.C. § 3-629, comment 1 (1949 version).
103. Leary, supra note 82.
104. Leary was writing about Proposed Final Draft No. 2. See id., at 928 n.
48. Section 736(3) of that proposed draft was similar to section 3-629(1) of the
1949 draft- "For the purposes of determining whether an item is properly payable,
an item has priority for payment over any notice or stop order received by or legal
process served upon the payor bank after its receipt of the item." See Leary,
supra note 82, at 928 n. 52.
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Leary's comments begin 05 with the proposition that the com-
mon law touchstone for determining priority between a check and
a legal like the stop order, notice or legal process was whether the
check was paid. He noted that the deferred posting operations, so
prevalent after World War II and incorporated into the 1949 draft
of the Uniform Commercial Code, postponed the time when the
check was finally paid. Since final payment of the check was post-
poned, the cut-off time on the legal was also postponed, thereby
extending the time during which the holder of the check bore the
risk that one of the legals would interfere with the check's pay-
ment. Leary thought that the deferred posting operations by the
payor banks should not operate in this manner to the detriment of
the holder because the purpose of deferred posting was to decrease
the cost of operation to the payor bank and not to increase the
period during which a holder's rights to payment on a check would
be in jeopardy. Thus, Leary suggested that the touchstone for de-
termining priority between a check and a legal should be separated
from the concept of final payment and pushed forward to the time
of the receipt of the check by the payor bank for a stop order,
notice, or legal service and to the end of the banking day for the
set-off. Sections 3-629(1) and 3-414(4) of the 1949 draft accom-
plished this change. By separating the touchstone for priority of
the legals from the concept of final payment, the period during
which the holder of a check was in jeopardy by one of the four
legals was reduced to a period very similar to what it had been
prior to the initiation of deferred posting operations'"
In the spring of 1950, another draft of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code appeared. In this draft, section 4-303's forerunner, sec-
tion 4-402(3), differs somewhat from the way it appeared in the
earlier 1949 draft:
An item properly payable when received is subject to notices, stop
orders or legal process received by the bank at any time up to
midnight of the day of receipt of the item unless prior to receipt
of such notices, stop orders or legal process payment of the item
has been made in cash or by remittance or the item has been
posted to the account of the customer.'0
This new section pushes back the cut-off time for the stop order,
notice or legal service to the later cut-off time provided for a
105. Leary, supra note 82.
106. See supra pp. 287-88.
107. U.C.C. § 4-402(3) (1950 version).
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bank's set-off under the prior 1949 draft. The payor bank's cut-off
time for set-off in the 1950 draft did not change from that of the
1949 draft, so the final cut-off time for all four legals was finally
the same."'5
Although the 1950 draft deferred the cut-off time for the stop
order, notice, or legal process from the time the check was received
to midnight of the day of its receipt, the cut-off time for all four
legals would still come as much as twenty-four hours earlier under
the 1950 draft than it would under present-day §4-303.11o The
comment to section 4-402 of the 1950 Code indicates that the pur-
pose of the section remains the same as the similar section of the
May 1949 draft: "While deferred posting is permitted under this
Article, it may not be practiced in such a way that items presented
on a Tuesday, for example, will prevail over items presented on
Monday. Similarly, a bank may not by a Tuesday's call or accelera-
tion defeat an item presented on Monday."
A significant change from section 4-303's earlier drafts ap-
peared in the proposed final draft #2 in the spring of 1951. Section
4-404 provides:
Any notice, stop order or legal process received and any valid set-
off exercised by a payor bank is entitled to priority over any item
drawn on or payable by and received by the bank until but not
after the item is accepted, certified, paid in cash, paid by separate
remittance for the particular item, posted to the indicated ac-
count of its customer or reaches that point of time in the process-
ing of an item when the bank evidences by action its decision to
pay the item, whichever happens first. °0
Several observations may be made about this change. First, the
germ of the omnibus clause is present: "or reaches that point of
time in the processing of an item when the bank evidences by ac-
tion its decision to pay the item. . . .""I Second, the general form
of the present section 4-303 may be seen. No longer is the cut-off
time for the four legals set at the early stage found in the 1949 or
1950 drafts. The cut-off time may, of course, come as early as ac-
108. of course, the cut-off time of the stop order, notice or legal process
would come earlier under section 4-402(3) than the set-off if the check were paid
in cash or by remittance or had been posted to the customer's account.
109. Section 4-303(1)(e) could push the time as far back as midnight of the
next bank day after receipt.
110. U.C.C. § 4-404 (1951 version).
111. Id.
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ceptance, certification, payment in cash or payment by separate re-
mittance for the particular item; but it may also come as late as a
deferred posting to the customer's account, although perhaps not
as late V the midnight deadline of the present section 4-303(1)e.
Third, Leary's attempt to separate priority questions from the con-
cept of final payment has been abandoned.
The reasons for the significant change in this proposed 1951
draft were expressed by Leary. Writing is 1965,112 he said that ini-
tially he and some of his banker friends felt that it would be possi-
ble to have a "day blockage" of items; in other words, have Mon-
day's items take precedence over Tuesday's stop order,
attachments and the like. That view was reflected in the earlier
drafts of 1949 and 1950. Unfortunately, he found that practical dif-
ficulties stood in the way of the "day blockage" rule. One of those
difficulties was the continuous processing of items on a 24-hour ba-
sis by the large banks. Another difficulty was the expectation of
customers to be paid immediately over the counter, for example,
on Tuesday without having to wait until the state of the cus-
tomer's account after the posting of Monday's items could be as-
certained. A third difficulty was that a bank's determination to ex-
ercise the right of set-off sometimes depended upon the nature and
amount of the items presented for payment, but the items
presented for payment during one day could not be ascertained
until the next day when the set-off would be too late under the day
blockage rule. In the end, the determination was made that the
day blockage rule had to go. In the light of the small percentage of
bad items, the added cost to all depositors to install procedures at
a bank to follow the day blockage rule was not worth the trouble.
Accordingly, the rule of payment was again chosen to determine
priority.Il
A few more changes were made in the final text edition of
November 1951. The appropriate section was finally designated
section 4-303 and provided:
Any notice, stop order or legal process received and any valid set-
off exercised by payor bank is entitled to priority over any item
drawn on or payable by and received by the bank until but not
after the item is accepted, certified, paid in cash, settled for by
separate remittance for the particular item, or the bank has com-
112. Leary, supra note 10, at 337.
113. With two additional elements: acceptance or certification and omnibus
clause, both of which are mentioned later in this article.
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pleted the process of posting the item to the indicated account of
the drawer, maker or the person to be charged therewith or other-
wise has evidenced by action its decision to pay the item, which-
ever happens first.
The omnibus clause finally appeared as it remains today in
present-day section 4-303, and the day blockage rule, which was
eliminated in the spring 1951 draft, is permanently gone. This lan-
guage of section 4-303 is that finally accepted by the American
Law Institute and Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for the
final text edition of the 1952 Code."'
Leary again commented on these changes. " 5 He noted that
the rule of payment was indeed chosen to determine priority in the
1952 edition but with two additional elements not considered in
determining final payment: acceptance or certification and the om-
nibus clause. Referring to the omnibus clause, he suggested that it
has two functions. The first is to cover the practice of "sight post-
ing," a function already noted in the comments. '16 The second,117
which he termed the more important, is to "eliminate, with respect
to the four legals, the extention of time given, in final payment
cases, by the inclusion in the definition of the 'process of posting'
of the concept of reversal of entries."1 " His reference to the "con-
cept of reversal of entries" obviously refers to section 4-109(e) "
by which in the same article he had argued that it would be diffi-
cult for a court to say that "the process of posting" had been com-
pleted so long as time remained in which entries could be re-
versed.12 0 Hence, Leary suggested that the omnibus clause could
bring about the cut-off time for the four legals prior to the comple-
tion of a posting process which remains incomplete until the time
for reversal of entries expires. This second function is proper, he
maintained, because additional time allowed a payor bank for re-
versal of entries should not result in any of the legals compelling a
reversal of entries if no such reversal should otherwise occur.
114. More changes, however, were to come after the New York Law Revision
Commission's study in 1954-56.
115. Leary, supra note 10, at 363.
116. U.C.C. § 4-303, comment 3.
117. Not mentioned in the comments to section 4-303.
118. Leary, supra note 10, at 364.
119. U.C.C. § 4-109(e): "correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action
with respect to the item."
120. Leary, supra note 10, at 360. The Wisconsin Supreme Court cited this
argument with approval in the West Side case. 37 Wis. at 665, 155 N.W.2d at 593.
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. When the 1952 official text of section 4-303 was promulgated,
section 4-109 did not exist,""1 perhaps explaining why the official
comments made no reference to Leary's second function of the om-
nibus clause. Could the second function have existed in 1952 prior
to the addition of section 4-109? Certainly not as Leary specifically
stated that second function in 1965; but even without section 4-
109, the omnibus clause still eliminates the extention of time given
in final payment cases under the process of posting as it was prior
to the addition of section 4-109. This proposition is shown by the
official comment's 2 illustration of the omnibus clause in conjunc-
tion with sight posting which brings about the cut-off time for the
four legals prior to the completion of the regular process of post-
ing. Leary's two functions for the omnibus clause may then be
combined into just one function: eliminating the extention of time
given in final payment cases under the process of posting. This sin-
gle function, which will allow the omnibus clause to cut off a legal
prior to completion of the posting process and final payment, still
reflects Leary's earlier attempts to separate the touchstone for pri-
ority from that of final payment.
C. SUMMARY OF PRE-1952 HISTORY
The pre-Code history of section 4-303 shows that the advent
of deferred posting statutes quite dramatically increased the time
during which a holder's right to payment of a check was in jeop-
ardy from a legal. These deferred posting statutes postponed pay-
ment and thereby postponed the cut-off time for the effectiveness
of the legals which was also determined by when payment oc-
curred. Attempts to lessen the holder's risk in the early drafts of
the Code apparently failed when provisions favoring an early cut-
off time for the legals proved impractical, and the Code's final text
version in 1952 again adopted the payment concept in deciding the
cut-off time for the legals.
If, however, the omnibus clause's function is to eliminate the
extension of time given in final payment cases under the process of
posting, section 4-303(1)(d) still retains something of the early re-
corder's idea that a payor bank's extra time to reverse under de-
ferred posting should not, at least in this small circumstance, come
at the expense of the holder. Based on this interpretation of sec-
tion 4-302's pre-Code history, a holder in a position similar to
121. Section 4-109 was added in 1962.
122. U.C.C. § 4-303, comment 3.
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West Side's could forcefully argue that its right to payment on the
check was jeopardized by a legal in exactly the situation that the
recorder unsuccessfully attempted to remedy in the holder's favor
in the early draft of the Code and, more specifically, in the exact
situation described by the omnibus clause which the drafters suc-
cessfully remedied in the holder's favor in the final official text ver-
sion of 1952. Thus, it may be asserted that the check should be
paid to the holder because the intent of the omnibus clause was to
prevent the holder from bearing the risk of loss during the exten-
sion of time given under the process of posting. 2 '
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
After the 1952 official text of the Uniform Commercial Code
was promulgated in September of 1951, Pennsylvania became the
first state to enact the Code; its approval of the Code came in 1953
with an effective date of July 1, 1954. The important commercial
state of New York, however, did not jump at the Code as did
Pennsylvania; the New York Legislature and Governor Dewey, in-
stead, referred the Code to the New York State Law Revision
Commission for study and recommendations. The Commission
spent the years 1953 through 1955 studying the Code and recom-
mended in a 1956 report that the Code as drafted should not be
enacted in New York without revision.""
As a result of the Commission's report, the Code's Editorial
Board recommended numerous changes in the 1952 official text. In
1957, the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated a 1957 official
text which embraced many of the changes suggested by the
Commission.
No one denies that the reports of the New York Law Revision
Commission are an invaluable source of legislative history for the
Code.125 Section 4-303, as it appeared in the 1952 official text, 2
123. One commentator surmised the drafter's purpose for the omnibus clause
in a manner supporting this conclusion: "The apparent thought of the draftsmen
was that a check-owner has equities superior to a Johnny-come-lately 'legal'
claimant, if the bank has taken steps toward paying it before the legal arised."
Rohner, supra note 24, at 1079.
124. The Commission's study and recommendations can be found in 1-2
COMMISSION REPORT (1954), 1-3 COMMISSION REPORT (1955) and 1 COMMISSION RE-
PORT (1956).
125. The reports have been termed the "richest single source of 'legislative
history' on the Code." R. BRAucHmR and R. RmEG=T, supra note 26, at 28. White
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was studied and analyzed in the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion reports and thus has had a legislative history which throws
some light on that section's omnibus clause and its effect on a
payor bank's liability to a holder. Although the importance of this
legislative history has been mentioned by some writers,"7 only
Walter E. Malcolm, the final reporter for Article 4, has attempted
to set out the legislative history as shown in the New York Law
Revision Commission reports.22 The New York Law Revision
Commission's analysis is quite applicable to the issue of whether
the omnibus clause of section 4-303 can impose liability on a payor
bank. It therefore deserves a more detailed examination than the
cursory one given it by Malcolm."'
The first mention of section 4-303 in the New York Law Revi-
sion Commission Reports is little more than a passing swipe. It
appears in the memorandum filed in February of 1954 by Milbank,
Tweed, Hope and Hanley and merely mentions that a notice, stop
order or legal process is entitled to priority; that there is no limita-
tion on the type of notice or legal process referred to in section 4-
303; and finally that section 4-303 apparently does not conform
with the requirements of a particular section of the New York
Banking Law.'8 0
and Summers suggest that the reports are of greater value to lawyers than prior
drafts and prior official texts with comments because the hearing and studies that
the Commission published cast light on what the Code draftsmen were trying to
do in the first place. J. Wum AD R. SuMMwwS, supra note 96, at 11.
126. For section 4-303 as it appeared in the 1952 official text see page 59,
supra.
127. Note, 43 Mo. L. Rav. 734 (1978); J. WHra AND R. SuMMERS, supra note
96, at 702 n. 163.
128. Malcolm, supra note 21, at 26.
129. Malcolm says that the legislative history of section 4-303 is "of interest."
Id. at 26. He sets out some of the legislative history in full in his articles, but
merely refers to some portions of it by reference to the Commission's Reports and
entirely omits reference to other portions. Subsequent footnotes will indicate Mal-
cohn's treatment of each part of the legislative history as to inclusion in full, mere
reference, or omittance.
130. Malcolm quotes in full this portion of the legislative history. Id. at 27. It
is as follows:
14. Section 4*303 introduces a number of questions. It provides that
"any notice, stop order, or legal process ... is entitled to priority." No
limitations are stated as to type of notice or legal process. Moreover, this
section would not appear to conform with the requirements of section
134(5) of the New York Banking Law.
1 COMMISSION REPORT 305 (1954). Mr. Malcolm makes no comments on this state-
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The first extensive treatment given section 4-303 was made in
a January 15, 1954, memorandum by Robert H. Brome. '3 He criti-
cized section 4-303 because "there may be a period of time before
an item is finally paid during which the item nevertheless has 'pri-
ority of payment' over the indicated item.1132 He said that this re-
sult of section 4-303 gives rise to some practical problems of which
he gives examples."3 The first of his three examples sets forth a
situation that is hauntingly close to the West Side case which was
ment's significance or lack of significance. One must wonder, of course, in exactly
what way section 4-303 does not conform to New York Banking Law. See page 52
supra in which a later analysis reports that section 4-303 does conform to New
York law.
131. Chairman of the Subcommittee on Bank Deposits and Collections of the
N.Y. State Bar Association's Special Committee to consider the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Formerly Assistant Counsel of the Federal Reserve Counsel to con-
sider the Uniform Comercial Code. Inside house counsel for Bankers Trust Com-
pany of New York City. His comments about section 4-303, which Malcolm also
records verbatim, are as follows:
Sec 4-303. When Items Subject to Notice, Stop-Order, Legal Process or
Set-Off; Order in Which Items May Be Charged or Certified. This section
provides, in effect, that there may be a period of time before an item is
finally paid during which the item nevertheless has priority of payment
over indicated items.
This is a substantial change in the law and may give rise to some
practical problems including-
1) If before posting but after settlement by separate remittance or
evidencing its decision to pay short of posting, the bank receives a stop
order, what is the basis of the bank's liability if it recognizes the stop
order and returns the item as unpaid within the time permitted by Secs.
4-301 and 4-302? It would appear that there is none.
2) If the bank has settled for an item by separate remittance (this is
the so-called "non-cash" item presented for separate remittance) in the
form of a draft, may it thereafter stop payment on that draft on the
ground that it has not "finally paid" the item for which the draft was
given? Would the bank not remain liable on its draft?
3) If the bank has not finally posted under Sec. 4-213 but has be-
come liable for the item under Sec. 302 for late return and then an at-
tachment is served, must the bank forthwith debit the check to the ac-
count and make settlement therefor notwithstanding its return? In other
words, how long will the existence of the liability hold off the levy?
1 CoMmissioN REPORT 318 (1954).
132. Id. Brome here uses the word "item" twice and the word "items" once.
The first and second one of the word item apparently here refers to a check while
the use of "items" apparently refers to the four legals: the notice, stop order, legal
process or set-off. •
133. See supra note 130.
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not to come up for some fourteen years. He asked about a drawee
bank's liability if it receives a stop payment order against a check
before the check is posted but after the bank has evidenced its
decision to pay short of posting, and subsequently the bank recog-
nizes the stop payment order and returns the check as unpaid
within the time permitted. He concluded that there is no basis for
a drawee bank's liability in such a case.
Assuming that we may equate the word "posted" in Brome's
hypothetical with section 4-213(1)(c)'s "completed the process of
posting," and the phrase "evidenced its decision to pay short of
posting" in the same hypotehtical with section 4-303(1)(d)'s omni-
bus clause, it appears that Brome has identified an area in which a
drawee bank can jump either way without liability. For example, if
a drawee bank has in fact "evidenced by examination of such indi-
cated account and by action its decision to pay" a check according
to section 4-303's omnibus clause, but has not yet gone so far as to
complete the posting process under section 4-213(1)(c), then
Brome suggested that the drawee bank is not liable to the holder
of a check if it decides to honor the stop payment order. His rea-
soning is apparently based on section 4-213(1)'s accountability lan-
guage184 not coming into play because the process of posting has
not yet been completed. On the other hand, if that same drawee
bank in the same situation refused to honor the stop payment or-
der and paid the holder of the check, even though it was not ac-
countable for the amount of the check under section 4-213(1)(c)'s
completion of the posting process, there could be no basis for lia-
bility against the drawee bank on the part of the drawer because
the stop payment order has come too late under section 4-303's
omnibus clause to be obeyed.
Brome's analysis of section 4-303 revealed a grave concern
about this period of discretion on the part of the payor bank which
occurs prior to completion of the posting process under section 4-
213(1)(c) and after the bank evidences its decision to pay short of
posting under section 4-303(1)(d)'s omnibus clause. This period of
discretion identified by Brome has been noted many times by legal
commentators; all seem to agree with Brome's assessment.,"
134. The accountability language is as follows: "Upon a final payment under
subparagraphs (b), (c) or (d) [of 4-213(1)] the payor bank shall be accountable for
the amount of the item." U.C.C. § 4-213(1).
135. See surpa note 10. See also Note, supra note 77, at 353 n. 27.
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Malcolm, then acting as the reporter for Article 4 , was the
logical person to address the criticisms leveled by Brome at section
4-303.137 Surprisingly, Malcolm brushed aside Brome's comments:
"The hypothetical cases you posed under this section have theoret-
ical difficulty. Query-How frequently will they arise in contested
cases.""' Malcolm thus does not deny the effect of section 4-303's
omnibus clause on a payor bank's discretion; he defends it by call-
ing the situation posing it theoretical and suggesting that it will
rarely arise.
Although Malcolm acknowledges in his brief legislative history
of section 4-303 that Brome replied to his short comment about
section 4-303, he places the reference to Brome's reply in a foot-
note and never states what Brome said in response. 8 The New
York Law Revision Commission reports reveal that Brome re-
sponded to Malcolm's comment in a long June 4, 1954, letter.'"0 In
136. Fairfax Leary, Jr., the original reporter for Article 4, had stepped down
by this time and was replaced by Malcolm.
137. Malcolm's response came in the form of a long letter, dated Feb. 17,
1954, to Brome and filed with the New York Law Revision Commission.
138. 1 COMMSSION REPoRT 342 (1954). Malcolm did, however, have much to
say about criticism leveled by Brome at other sections of Article 4. Malcolm
quotes his response verbatim in his legislative history.
139. Malcolm, supra note 21, at 28 n. 9. Actually Brome's reply to section 4-
303's criticism begins two pages earlier than Malcolm records in his footnote.
140. This provision (Sec. 403) is discussed below, but at the risk of being
repetitious, this writer would like to point out that it is not "practical" for the
following reasons:
(a) The giving of unconditional credit is not final payment but under
this section an attachment, etc., received after the giving of such credit
but before final posting is entitled to "priority", which means that the
payor bank must somehow recover the unconditional credit or, to the
extent that the section is effective, be responsible for the amount of the
item twice.
(b) By creating an area where a stop payment is not given "priority"
even though received before the item is "finally paid", you either (i) have
an absurdity because the payor bank may refuse to pay the item without
liability to anyone except the customer who has ordered payment
stopped, or (ii) you indirectly transform the item into an assignment and
make the payor bank legally obligated to the holder to pay because it has
received a stop order.
(c) You single out the "separate remittance for the particular item"
as an act giving the item priority over stop orders, etc. Under some cir-
cumstances which a remittance would constitute any unconditional
credit (but no reason is indicated why this form of unconditional credit is
more sacred than any other), and under other circumstances it would
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the letter, Brome again referred to that period of discretion cre-
clearly not be unconditionaL For instance, this is the customary form of
remittance for non-cash items which are, as you know, always sent for
collection and remittance, i.e., the bank is expected to remit only if the
item is paid. Why should this form of unconditional credit give the item
"priority" where unconditional credit in some other form does not (e.g.,
clearing house credit that has become unconditional because the item
can no longer be returned through the clearings)? And on the other hand
a small bank may receive or send a cash letter with only one item. Under
current deferred postings that one item would be remitted or immedi-
ately subject to return the next banking day. Why should this completely
provisional settlement give the item "priority"?
I have never seen any good reason expressed for trying to establish
one time when items have "priority of payment" over stop orders, etc.,
and another when they are finally paid.
1 COMMISSION Rm'or 359 (1954).
Sec.4-3039. When Items Subject to Notice, etc.
In my memorandum I noted three practical problems here which
your brush off as "theoretical". You ask "how frequently will they arise
in contested cases?" This, I think, is typical of your broad brush. I have
discussed these points above, but I would like to consider them again in
the light of your comment here.
(1) You make a great point of this provision which gives "priority of
payment" to certain items before they have been "finally paid", although
I have found nothing in the comments or literature on this section to
indicate the reason for this difference. I pointed out that in the case of
stop orders, at least, the bank apparently could disregard this section
and return the unpaid item without liability. Doesn't this illustrate that
the provision is just a little silly? Stop orders are given with great fre-
quency and often involve a race with time. Accordingly, I think banks
will be faced fairly frequently with the problem--do we give effect to the
customer's stop order, return the item to the holder and risk a possible
test suit under this statute, or do we give priority to the item and argue
with the customer as to how far we had gone in the posting process.
(2) I pointed out that the customary way of paying (and I mean
finally paying) for non-cash items (as you know they are normally not
settled for provisionally) is by separate remittance. I then inquired
whether the bank would stop payment on its draft (separate remittance)
on the ground that it had not "finally paid" under the statute because it
hadn't posted the item as required for final payment. I don't blame you
for side-stepping this question. Among other things, I think it helps to
illustrate the absurdity of the rule that separate remittance for the par-
ticular item is not final payment in any case. I strongly suspect that a
properly informed court would hold that such a remittance for a non-
cash item represents an agreement varying the terms of the Code, just as
informed courts will probably hold in the case of other unconditional
credits, but these sections certainly invite confusion and litigation. Such
separate remittances are made daily, and I am not prepared to guess how
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ated by section 4-303 "where a stop order is not given priority"
even though received before the item is "finally paid," an obvious
reference once again to that period of time between final payment
under the completion of the posting process of section 4-213(1)(c)
and something short of the posting process under the omnibus
clause. He commented that there are two possible results from the
creation of this period of discretion: the payor bank may refuse to
pay the check without liability to the holder, or the check is indi-
rectly transformed into an assignment making the payor bank le-
gally obligated to pay the holder because it has received the stop
order.1 41 In one short summary, Brome has summed up the oppos-
ing arguments between the drawee bank and the holder which will
appear in the West Side briefs and in subsequent cases to be dis-
cussed in this article. The drawee bank argues Brome's first result:
the payor bank may honor the stop order and refuse to pay the
holder because final payment has not occurred under section 4-
213(1)(c)'s completion of the posting process. The holder of a
check argues Brome's second result: the drawee bank must pay the
holder because the stop order has arrived too late.
In the same letter, Brome directly answered Malcolm's query
about how frequently his earlier hypothethical would arise in con-
tested cases. In a prophetic manner, Brome said:
Stop orders are given with great frequency ... Accordingly, I
think banks will be faced fairly frequently with the problem--do
we give effect to the customer's stop order, return the item to the
holder and risk a possible test suit under the statute, or do we
give priority to the item and argue with the customer as to how
far we have gone in the posting process.1 42
many contested cases will result. One would be bad enough if it involved
my bank.
(3) I pointed out that legal process is entitled to "priority" over an
item until but not after the bank has become liable for the item under
Sec. 4-302 dealing with late returns. A bank having returned an item late
would not, of course, have charged the same to the drawer's account (or
might have first charged and then reversed the charge); and I asked must
the bank forthwith re-charge the account (and thereupon finally paid the
item?) or just how long will the bank's liability hold off the levy? If this
question is theoretical then so are the provisions of the section.
1 COMMISSION REPORT 361-62 (1954).
141. "A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of
any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is
not liable of the instrument until he accepts it." U.C.C. § 3-409.
142. 1 COMMISSIoN REPORT 361 (1954).
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Certainly, Marine National Exchange Bank of Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin, had to answer Brome's question in August of 1966 when Paine,
Webber's stop order arrived after the bank had sent the check
through the sorting and encoding machines and the electronic
computer and after it had charged the check to the customer's ac-
count, affixed a "paid" stamp to it, photographed it, cancelled it,
and filed it in its customer's account.1
43
Brome's overall criticism of section 4-303 can be summarized
in his statement that he had never seen any good reason expressed
for trying to establish one time when items have priority of pay-
ment over one of the four legals and another when they are finally
paid.144 Brome, who knew that time of payment determined prior-
ity under pre-Code law, is obviously referring to the effect of sec-
tion 4-303's omnibus clause which could cut off the effectiveness of
the four legals prior to a payor bank's final payment under section
4-213, thus establishing one time for priority and another time for
payment. Indeed, if the omnibus clause were eliminated from sec-
tion 4-303(1)(d), the concept of payment would again bring about
priority under the Code since the events under section 4-303 on
priority would then be identical with the events under section 4-
213 on final payment." '
Brome and Malcolm again confronted each other during hear-
ings held by the Law Revision Commission. Malcolm defended Ar-
ticle 4 in the presence of Brome and many others. Section 4-303
naturally came up in the hearings, but Brome's criticism of its es-
tablishment of one time for priority and another time for payment
143. 37 Wis. at 662, 155 N.W.2d at 589. Malcolm, in reviewing section 4-303's
legislative history, was apparently not impressed with Brome's prediction of the
West Side case. He noted, "This review of the legislative history of Section 4-
303(1) indicates that New York Counsel were concerned with various possible dif-
ficulties with the priority language but the difficulties they expressed were various
theoretical uncertainties quite far removed from the facts arising in West Side."
Malcolm, supra note 21, at 30. For the difficulties on this "priority" language see
pages 79-83, supra.
144. 1 COMMISSION REPORT 359 (1954). This statement seems to indicate that
Brome has at least read some of the reasons for establishing one time for priority
and another for payment, such as those expressed in Leary, supra note 82 or the
comments on the prior drafts of section 4-303 before the 1952 official text version.
Later in the same June 4, 1954 reply, Brome says that he has found nothing in
the comments or the literature on this section to indicate the reason for the dif-
ferences. 1 COMMISSION REPORT 361 (1954).
145. Except, of course, for section 4 -303(1)(a)'s acceptance or certification.
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never surfaced." "
The New York Law Revision Commission nevertheless contin-
ued to scrutinize section 4-303 and its omnibus clasue. Two exten-
sive memorandums dealing with Article 4, including section 4-303,
were filed with the Commission in late 1954.147 In the first memo-
randum, William J. Hickey came out squarely on Brome's side
in stating that section 4-303 alone does not create any duty of the
payor bank running to the holder or presenter to pay a check.1 49
146. 1 COMMISSION REPORT 473 (1954). 1 New York Revision Commission,
Report for 1954 at p. 473 (1954). Perhaps the problem was never mentioned as a
result of the two memoranda later filed with Commission by research assistants
Hickey and Killian discussed later in the text on pages 77 and 78.
147. Only one of the two memoranda, the September 29, 1954 memorandum
by John D. Killian, 1I, is mentioned in Malcolm's article setting out the legisla-
tive history. No portion of the Killian memorandum is quoted in the article. Mal-
colm, supra note 21, at 28.
148. Hickey is listed as a research assistant under the direction of Professor
William Tucker, Dean of the Cornell Law School.
149. 2 COMMISSION RPORT 1250 (1955). Hickey does not state on what au-
thority he makes this statement. His analysis of section 4-303 is as follows:
Section 4-303: This section is written in terms of "priorities" be-
tween items considered as claims against an account and a stop-payment
order, "notice" or legal process against the account or the bank's own
right of set-off which is its own claim against the account. In effect, the
Section states detailed rules as to when a stop-payment order, notice or
service or process against the account "comes too late" to require the
payor bank to interrupt the process of payment. Section 4-303 in itself
does not create any duty of the payor bank running to the holder or
presenter to pay an item. It does give the bank an immunity from liabil-
ity for its disregard of a stop-payment order, "notice" or process. When
an item placed for collection has been received by a payor bank and one
of the five conditions of subsection (1) has been met, it is then too late to
subject the account to a "notice", stop-order, legal process of set-off
which would otherwise have priority. Liability to the executor of a dece-
dent drawer or to a drawer or his levying creditor then hinges on action
or non-action specified in the section. Payment of an item where the "no-
tice", stop-payment order or process would be effective apart from this
section to preclude the bank from charging its customer's account may
be considered action taken in the course of collection to the same extent
that the act of payment has been treated as within the meaning of Sec-
tion 4-102(2) in discussion of other sections. However, the "liability" in
question is not liability for the act of payment. It is, rather, liability on
the undischarged debt of the bank to its own customer. (See Stella Flour
& Feed Corporation v. National City Bank 285 App. Div. [sic] 182, 136,
N.Y.S. 2d 139 (1st Dep't (1954)). On the other hand, in jurisdictions
where the liability of a bank for disregarding a stop-payment order is
treated as arising from breach of a duty of ordinary care, Section 4-302
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Hickey then suggested a purpose for section 4-303 never expressly
mentioned before; he said that it gives the bank an immunity from
liability for its disregard of a stop payment order, notice or pro-
cess.160 Presumably, he meant that if a bank is confronted with the
decision whether to pay a check or to honor one of the four legals,
and it makes its decision correctly acording to section 4-303, the
bank will be immune from any liability in favor of the party which
instituted the stop payment order, notice, or legal process. Put
more simply, section 4-303 will act as a shield for the drawee bank
if it uses it correctly. Hickey did not mention Mr. Brome's concern
about the establishment of one time for determining priority ques-
tions and another time for determining payment questions.
In the second memorandum ified with the New York Law Re-
vision Commission, John D. Killian, IH,15 began by noting that
might be considered to determine liability for the act of paying in disre-
gard of that duty. (Cf. Speroff v. First-Central Trust, 149 Ohio St. 415,
79 N.E.2d 119 (1948)).
There would seem to be no room for doubt that, apart from Section 4-
102(2), the statutes of the jurisdiction where the payor bank is located,
under which an attachment or execution is levied on an account, control
as to the effectiveness of the levy.
Id. at 1250-51.
150. Id. at 1250.
151. Killian is also listed as a research assistant under the direction of Pro-
fessor William Tucker, Dean. His analysis is set forth as follows:
Under present law, the question whether a notice, stop-order, or le-
gal process received by the bank is effective to prevent proper payment
of the item is made to depend (so far as the time element is concerned)
upon whether the payor bank has "paid" the item, i.e., whether the col-
lection process within the payor bank with respect to the particular item
has progressed to that point where the item has been discharged by pay-
ment and the payor bank has become accountable for it.
Id. at 1460.
In drafting the Code, the draftsmen have considered that the factors
to be given effect in determining whether a notice, stop-order or legal
process received, or valid setoff exercised by a payor bank, is timely are
not necessarily the same as those determining when the item is "finally
paid" for other purposes. The draftsmen note that other acts, by the
payor ban such as certification, acceptance, and the sending of a separate
remittance for the item-acts which do not constitute "final payment"
(except the case where a separate remittance now constitutes an "irrevo-
cable credit" under N.Y.N.I.L., § 350-b, although not under the Code)-
place the payor bank in such a position that on policy grounds it should
not be required to reverse its action and attempt to recover its former
position. Thus, Section 4-303(1) has been drafted to state relative "pri-
orities" rather than rules of time of payment. It lists among the actions
1982]
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of the payor bank which give the item "priority" those acts which consti-
tute final payment by a payor bank under Section 4-213(1), and also cer-
tain acts which occur before that stage of the process is reached where
the item is "finally paid by the payor bank". It also includes in the list
the accrual of liability of the bank for late return of the item, under Sec-
tion 4-302, which operates to render the payor bank liable to the cus-
tomer of the depository bank for the amount of the item as if it had fully
paid the item.
Id. at 1460-61.
By stating the relative priorities of various legal events and items
held by the payor bank, the Code is in effect defining the "timeliness" of
those various legal events which in a given case take priority. A legal
event effective in other respects may be said to be "effective" from the
point of view of "timeliness" when it affects the account of the drawer
and eliminates or freezes all or part of whatever balance is available to
pay the item, so as to preclude a payment of the item. Conversely, a legal
event which is not timely does not preclude a "payment" of the item and
no person acquires from that legal event a right to say that the bank
should not have paid the item or that its action in charging the account
of the customer is either a nullity or is unjustified. (See Comment (1) to
§ 4-303.). It should be emphasized that the provisions of Section 4-303(1)
in no way define or affect the validity of the legal event involved in a
particular case in any respect other than its timeliness to intercept pay-
ment of particular items. The text of the section does not clearly indicate
that effectiveness of the legal events enumerated is being defined only in
the sense of timeliness. The only evidence for such analysis which the
Cdoe supplies (apart from the purpose of the section as it may be in-
ferred from existing law) is to be found in Comment (5) to Section 4-303
which states:
In the case of notice, stop orders and legal process the effective
time for measuring their priority status or lack of it, is receipt plus
the extra time required or specified in Sections 1-201(27) and 4-
403. In the case of set-off, the effective time is when the set-off is
actually made. (Emphasis added.)
It should also be observed that the proposition that an item has
"priority" over a notice, stop-order or legal processdoes not mean that
the holder of the item thereby acquires a right to have it paid by the
bank. Some of the facts stated in the lettered paragraphs of Section 4-
303(1) are facts that, in themselves, give the holder a right against the
bank either to payment of the item, or to remittance of the proceeds, or
for the amount of the item (i.e., where the item has been accepted, or the
bank has completed the process of posting, or has become liable for late
return). Indeed, the circumstance that the bank has become obligated for
the amount of the item in these cases justifies the rule that a stop-pay-
ment or legal process thereafter comes too late. In other cases the bank
will have no obligation to the holder of an item, even though it has "pri-
ority" but it still has its obligation to its own customer to honor his
checks, and, under Section 4-303, may be liable for wrongful dishonor if
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it fails to do so. This conclusion seems to follow from the language of the
preamble that "Any notice, stop-order or legal process received and valid
set off exercised . . . is entitled to priority over any item drawn on or
payable by and received by the bank until but not after the bank has
done any of the following".
With an exception in the case of the payor bank becoming liable for
late return under Section 4-302, each of the events enumerated in Sec-
tion 4-303(1) which give the item priority occur concurrently with or sub-
sequently to one particular point in the collection process within the
payor bank (except in special cases), namely, the point when the payor
bank makes its decision to pay or dishonor, i.e., when the bookkeeper for
the maker's or drawer's account determines or verifies that the item is in
good form and that there are sufficient funds in the maker's or drawer's
account to cover it. This decision is made prior to acceptance, certifica-
tion, cash payment, settlement by separate remittance, or the completion
of the process of posting, but after such preliminary acts such as receipt-
ing for the item in a passbook or making another form of provisional
settlement, which acts do not evidence the payor bank's final decision to
pay. Evidence that this decision is the controlling point of time in the
collection process within the payor bank when the item is to receive pri-
ority under the Code, is to be found in the language of paragraph (d) of
Section 4-303, "or otherwise has evidenced by examination of such indi-
cated account and by action its decision to pay the item."
This reasoning is not new in the Code. In Nineteenth Ward Bank v.
First National Bank, 184 Mass. 49, 51, 67 N.E. 670, 671 (1903), in deter-
mining whether a notice of insolvency had been received by the payor
bank prior to payment of the item (a note payable at the bank), the
Court said:
In this state of things the cashier, charged with the duties and
invested with the powers of the defendant both as to the plaintiff
[the presenting bank] and as to the makers respecting this note
[the item in question], proceeds on October 7, 1901, soon after the
beginning of the day's business, to the performance of his tasks. He
intends, as agent of the makers, to pay this note to his own bank,
the indorsee and holder, and as such entitled to receive payment
and discharge the note. He intends as cashier of his own bank to
cancel and discharge the note when paid, and then as agent for the
makers to hold the paid note for them. After the note has been
paid, he intends to send the proceeds to plaintiff. With these inten-
tions, he begins. The note is before him. He first draws on a bank
in Boston his check as cashier of the defendant, payable to the or-
der of the plaintiff for the amount of the proceeds of the note. It is
to be observed that this is not the check of the makers nor is it
made by the cashier as their agent, but in his capacity as agent of
the defendant, and in the performance not of a duty owed by the
makers but of a duty owed by the defndant to the plaintiff. It is
not the check by which the note was paid because none was
needed, but was the check by which the proceeds were to be trans-
A
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mitted by the defendant to the plaintiff. He then makes a memo-
randum of this check upon a block, stamps upon the face of the
note "Paid Oct. 1901, First National Bank, So. Weymouth, Mass.,"
and perforates the note in three places. He then puts the note thus
stamped and mutilated in the file with his checks, so that the
proper record of the transaction may be entered at the end of the
day upon the permanent books. So far he has gone when he is
called to the telephone and notified that the makers have made an
assignment for the benefit of their creditors, and he is requested by
the assignee to hold the account. He replies that there is one
(meaning this) note which he had paid or "made a check for it."
Soon afterwards, at the request of the assignee, he withheld the
check he had drawn and undertook to retrace his steps.
We are of the opinion that prior to the call to the telephone
the note had been paid by the makers to the defendant, and that
the only remaining duty resting upon the defendant was to remit
the proceeds to the plaintiff...
Comment (3) to Section 4-303 describes this reasoning as follows:
The sixth event conferring priority is stated by the language "or oth-
erwise has evidenced by examination of such indicated account and by
action its decision to pay the item." This general "omnibus" language is
necessary to pick up other possible types of action impossible to specify
particularly but where the bank has examined the account to see if there
are sufficient funds and has taken some action indicating an intention to
pay. One example is what has something been called "sight posting"
where the bookkeeper examines the account and makes a decision to pay
but postpones posting. The clause should be interpreted in the light of
Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat. Bank of Weymouth, 184 Mass. 49,
67 N.E. 670 (1903). It is not intended to refer to various preliminary acts
in no way close to a true decision of the bank to pay the item, such as
receipt of the item over the counter for deposit, entry of a provisional
credit in a passbook, making of a provisional settlement through the
clearing house or the mailing of a general remittance covering a group of
items including the one in question. In view of Section 4-301 any of these
actions is provisional and none of them evidences the bank's decision to
pay the item.
Id. at 1461-64.
Comparison of Section 4-303 with Present Law
As pointed out above, the question of priorities under present law is
resolved as a question of whether the item has been paid. The time "time
of payment" is decisive, and the question [sic) is not phrased in terms of
relative priorities. Brannan's Negotiatble Instruments Law 882 (6th ed.
1938) states:
But if a check or note payable at a bank is presented to the
bank by the holder in person, stamped by the teller "paid", but
before he had paid over the money, the teller is notified that the
drawer had made as assignment for the benefit of creditors, or had
not the money on deposit, or the deposit had been garnished, and
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the teller then erased the paid mark and returned the check, it
could hardly be claimed that this was a payment so as to discharge
the drawer.... So also, if the instrument was sent by the holder
to the bank by messenger or by mail. The instrument has not, in
fact, been paid, but it may well be that the holder or the collecting
bank, even in the absence of any custom or usage, should have the
option of holding the drawee bank because of the manner in which
it had dealt with the instrument, which was the holder's property,
or of holding the drawer or maker because the instrument has not
be honored.
Thus at the outset, Section 4-303 represents a departure from pre-
sent law by phrasing the problem differently.
This change in emphasis can best be noted by observing the reason-
ing of a New York court in deciding that an acceptance was affected by a
subsequent notice of claim against the drawer's deposits and therefore
the holder's action against the acceptor on the acceptance was not barred
by the judgement of the claimant against the acceptor. In Consolidated
Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 129 App. Div.[sic] 538, 114 N. Y. S. 308
(2d Dep't 1908), where this decision was reached, the Court reasoned
that the check was "paid" by its acceptance, when it was marked as paid,
and the amount of the check credited to the holder's account, and that
these acts constituted the accepting bank a "debtor" to the amount of
the credit given, citing Oddie v. Nat. City Bank, 45 N. Y. 735, 6 Am.
Rep. 160 (1871). The Court said: "In legal effect there was just as much a
payment of the check.., as though a messenger from the plaintiff bank
had presented the check at the teller's window... and received therefor
the currency." Rather than state that the acceptance gave the item "pri-
ority" over the notice of claim, the Court merely said that inasmuch as
the acceptance occurred prior to the notice and commencement of the
action, "that action cannot of course be a bar to the maintenance of this
[action on the acceptance]." (See Hamburger Bros. v. Third Nat. Bank,
132 Pa. Super. 421, 200 AtL[sic] 696 (1938) (acceptance before
bankruptcy).)
"Final payment" under present law as found in N.Y.N.I.L., § 350-b
includes payment in cash, completion of the process of posting, and the
giving of an irrevocable credit Thus, with respect to subparagraphs (b)
and (c) and the first half of (d), of Section 4-303(1), present law generally
relies upon similar events as constituting acts or events sufficient to give
the item "priority". With the exception of the liability for late return
category, in subparagraph (e), of Section 4-303(1), New York law is in
accord with the acts which give the item priority. First National Bank v.
National Park Bank, 181 App. Div.[sic] 103, 168 N. Y. S. 422 (1st Dep't
1917), indicates that New York law, like the Code, regards the bank's
decision to pay or dishonor as the crucial point of time after which a
notice or other legal event cannot get priority. In that case, the defen-
dant-drawee, appealed from a judgment for plaintiff, payee of a check,
and from an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial and for
leave to reopen the case. The plaintiff-payee had brought the action on
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the theory that the defendant-drawee had irrevocably accepted the check
where the plaintiff had forwarded the check to its correspondent for col-
lection and the correspondent presented the check throught the New
York Clearing House, of which the defendant was a member, and the
defendant made a tentative entry on its books on receiving the check,
but made no unequivocal act indicting an intention to pay the check and
returned it the same day to the correspondent after receiving the notice
that the drawer had been taken over by the State Banking Department
of New Jersey. After receiving this notice the defendant had erased the
entry made in its balance ledger account and returned the check, receiv-
ing the amount of the check for which the correspondent had received
credit on the tentative settlement, through the clearing house. The plain-
tiff's argument was that the defendant in receiving the check at the
clearing house became the agent of the owner to present it to itself for
payment, and that while it then had a right to reject it for any reason the
same as it would have had a right to refuse payment as between it and
the owner of the check, had the check been presented over the counter,
still that by passing on the check to the extent shown and making the
entry in the balance ledger account it manifested its intention to pay the
check and to ratify the payment there of which it had already made ten-
tatively through the clearing house. The Appellate Division reversed the
judgment for the plaintiff and granted a new trial to the defendant. The
importance of the holding lies in the fact that the Court recognized that
the process of collection in the drawee bank had not progressed far
enough to a point where the action of the bank was irrevocable or could
be said to amount to payment, and that the limited action that had been
taken was not sufficient to prevent a notice from freezing the deposit
balance in the drawer's account.
With respect to the event based upon liability for late return which
gives the item priority, no case authorities have been found to compare
present law with the Code. However, an inference may be drawn from
N.Y.N.I.L., § 350-b that the payor bank would be held liable for late
return under that section. If so, it would sem to follow that such liability
would be construed as sufficient to give the item priority.
Following are some illustrations of cases dealing with notices, stop
orders and legal process which serve to indicate that the principle and
most of the rules of Section 4-303 are a codification of existing case law
in this State. Included are some references to cases from other
jurisdictions.
In Chrzanowska v. Corn Exchange Bank, 173 App. Div.[sic] 285, 159
N. Y. S. 210 (1st Dep't 1916), the plaintiff sought to cash a check at a
branch of the defendant bank in which he had an account. The check
was drawn upon an account in another branch of the defendant. The
drawer died a few hours before the check was presented. The teller at the
depository branch entered a credit for the amount of the check in the
plaintiff's passbook and informed plaintiff that she could draw upon this
balance immediately. The following day plaintiff drew a check for $100.
Subsequently the check was sent to the drawee branch through the main
[Vol. 4:279
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bank and at the time it arrived the drawee branch was notified (appar-
ently orally) of the drawer's death. The check was returned unpaid and
the depositary bank charged back and demanded a return of the $100
which the plaintiff had withdrawn. The plaintiff brought this action to
recover the balance of the account before the charge-back was exercised.
The Appellate Division reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and entered
judgment for the defendant on its counterclaim for $100. The Court
stated its findings of fact and law as follows:
A check is not the assignment of the fund on deposit to the
credit of the drawer pro tanto, and the holder is merely the agent
of the drawer for the purpose of collecting it, and upon the death
of the drawer before presentation the authority of the holder is re-
voked, and the bank is no longer authorized to pay; but on princi-
ples of necessity incident to the banking business, if the bank pays
in good faith and without notice of the death of the drawer, it is
protected. (Glennan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 209
N.Y. 12.) If the plaintiff did not know the law, and acted in good
faith in failing to disclose the death of the drawer, then the teller
in crediting the check to the plaintiff's account acted under a mis-
take of a material fact, and if the plaintiff knew the law, and pur-
posely concealed the death of the drawer from the teller, she perpe-
trated a fraud on the bank, and in either case she obtained a credit
to which she was not entitled, for in any event her authority to
collect the check had been revoked by the death of the drawer.
Much stress is laid by the learned counsel for the respondent on
the fact that the check was credited to plaintiff's account and that
she was informed by the receiving teller that she would draw
against it. The only significance of that is its bearing on the ques-
tion as to whether the check was accepted and credited to the
plaintiff's acount unconditionally, or received for collection and
credited to her account subject to being charged back if not paid,
for manifestly these facts present no evidence of estoppel upon
which it could be held that the bank could not there after be heard
to say that the plaintiff might not draw the undrawn balance of the
credit it gave her on the check ...
(See Chaffee v. Bank, 40 Ohio St. 1 (1883) (Bank had no authority to pay
a check drawn after it had received notice of the assignment of the
drawer; it was held that the bank paying a check of a depositor, who to
their knowledge had made an assignment for the benefit of credits before
the presentment of the check, was liable to make payment again to the
assignee when it turned out that the check was given after the assign-
ment, although in fact it was antedated and appeared to have given sev-
eral days before the assignment was made.))
In Paino Bros., Inc. v. Central National Bank of Yonkers, 270 N. Y.
585, 1 N. E. 2d 342 (1936), af'g 245 App. Div.[sic] 751, 280 N.Y.S. 458
(2d Dep't 1935), the jury was allowd to find that the depositor and the
drawee bank had entered into a special agreement whereby the checks
were treated as cash as soon as deposited. The jury having so found, the
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Court held the drawer had no right to stop-payment once the checks
were deposited.
Another case, A Sidney Davison Coal Co., Inc. v. National Park
Bank, 201 App. Div. 309, 194 N. Y. S. 220 (1st Dep't 1922), held that a
verbal stop-order to a bank, requesting it to refuse payment of a trade
acceptance payable at the bank, was insufficient in the absence of a
showing that the stop-order "was given prior to the payment of the draft
or a sufficient time prior thereto" to have enabled the bank, in the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence, to act upon the order.
To the same effect see Brandt v. The Public Bank, 139 App. Div.
[sic] 173, 123, N. Y. S. 807 (2d Dep't 1910); Steiner v. Germantown
Trust Co., 104 Pa. Super. 38 158 AtL[sic] 180 (1932).
N.Y.N.I.L., § 325-a (not part of the U.N.I.L.) provides that payment
cannot be stopped on an instrument after it has been certified at the
request of the drawer, payee or holder.
§325-a. No stopping payment after certification
A bank, banker or trust company which has certified a check,
note, or other instrument for the payment of money at the request
of the drawer, payee or holder thereof shall not thereafter be re-
quired to stop or refuse payment thereof upon the order, demand
or request of the drawer or of any other party thereto.
In Rosen v. Rosen, 17 Cal. App. 2d 601, 62 Pac. 2d [sic] 384 (1936), it
was held that where the drawee back received a check, ran it through the
adding machine, sorted it aphabetically and checked for date, indorse-
ment and genuiness of the signature of the drawer, all before a levy of
execution was made on the bank account, the bank accepted the check
before the levy and the payee of the check was entitled to the amount
thereof as against the judgment creditor under the levy. (It should be
observed that this would not constitute "acceptance" under Code §3-410.
It might under §4-303(d) constitute evidence of decision to pay.)
See annotation, 84 A. L. R. 412 (1933), entitled "Negotiable Instru-
ments law as affecting rights as between holder of check or draft and
attaching creditor, receiver, assignee for creditors, or administrator of
drawer whose rights attached before presentment." Cf. New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 447, 80 S. W. 1058 (1904). No
New York cases have been found dealing with the relative priorities of
legal process and items drawn upon the account which the process has
been executed.
Subsection (2) provides:
Subject to the provisions of subsection (1) items may be ac-
cepted, paid, certified or charged to the indicated account of its
customer in any order convenient to the bank.
There are no rules in the statutes, decisions, Federal Reserve Regu-
lations, or clearing house rules, requiring banks to complete certain ac-
tions before others. What rules there are prescribe time limits and set
standards of ordinary care and operation for the bank's handling of items
it receives. Therefore since the order of operations and actions is not pre-
scribed, the banks under present law may govern their internal affairs
[Vol. 4:279
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pre-Code questions of priority were determined by payment 6 2 but
that the draftsman of the Code believed that factors considered in
determining whether a legal came too late were not necessarily the
same as those used in determining whether an item was finally
paid. He, therefore, recognized immediately the establishment of
the two different times criticized by Brome, and he attributed the
drafter's position to "policy grounds" that a bank sometime before
payment should nevertheless not be required to reverse its action
as a result of a legal. 63 Killian did not criticize the use of a step,
such as the omnibus clause, prior to payment under section 4-213
to end the effectiveness of a legal as did Brome in his June 4, 1954,
letter to Malcolm.
Killian's memorandum further supported Hickey's two views
of section 4-303. Killian said that the proposition that a check has
"priority" over one of the legals does not mean that a check's
holder acquires a right to have it paid by the bank.1 5 4 Additionally,
he said that if a legal comes too late, it does not preclude payment
of the check, and no one acquires from that legal a right to say
that the bank should not have paid the check or charged the ac-
count; in other words, the bank is immune from liability for paying
a check if the legal comes too late under section 4-303.' 51 Again
section 4-303 is mentioned as a shield for the drawee bank.
When Kilian finally mentioned the omnibus clause, he identi-
fied it as the controlling point in the collection process within the
payor bank when a check is to receive priority.'" He said that the
and processes as they individually set fit. Subsection (2) plainly states
the accepted understanding that internal affairs are best regulated by the
banks themselves.
No authority directly on point has been found. Analogously, how-
ever, it has been held that a bank may pay checks received at one time
through the clearing house in any order it may choose or find convenient.
Reinish v. Consolidated National Bank, 45 Pa. Super. 236 (1911).
Id. at 1467-72.
152. See discussion of pre code questions of priority in text at pages 41 and
42 supra.
153. 2 CoMMnssIoN REPORT 1460 (1955). Killian does not mention the omni-
bus clause as one factor to be used in determining priority but not payment; he
mentions certification, acceptance and the sending of a separate remittance for an
item. The sending of a separate remittance draft was later eliminated from sec-
tion 4-303 as a factor to used in determining priority.
154. Id. at 1462.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1463.
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omnibus clause is the point when the payor bank makes its deci-
sion to pay or dishonor and brings about priority at that time; eve-
rything else under section 4-303(1)261 comes after that decision,
and he mentioned the acts of acceptance, certification, cash pay-
ment, settlement by separate remittance, and the completion of
the posting process.158 Once again, Killian clearly saw the drafter's
apparent intention to establish one time to decide priority ques-
tions and another time to decide payment questions.
Killian did not join in Brome's criticism of section 4-303 for its
establishment of the two different times for priority in payment.
Furthermore, he said that present New York law is in accord with
the acts which section 4-303(1) provide for giving priority.'5 ' He
then cited a case which he said indicates that New York law, like
the Code's omnibus clause, "regards the bank's decision to pay or
dishonor as a crucial point of time after which a notice or other
legal event cannot get priority."' 06
Indeed, the only criticism of section 4-303 offered by Killian is
that present New York law phrased the question in terms of "time
of payment" and not in terms of "relative priorities" as did the
Code."61 In other words, section 4-303 represented "a departure
from present law by phrasing the problem differently."'' Rather
than speaking in terms of payment giving priority to a check or
lack of payment giving priority to a stop order, the New York
157. The one exception is the case of a payor bank becoming liable for late
return under section 4-302. He apparently means section 4-302(1)(a) when a
payor bank, which is not also a depositary bank, retains a check beyond midnight
of the banking day of receipt. Such an action could well come prior to a bank's
decision to pay or dishonor.
158. 2 COMMISSION REP ORT, supra note 152, at 1462.
159. Id. at 1468. He lists one exception to this statement--section 4-
303(1)(e)'s liability for late returns-but he later even justifies section 4-303(1)(e)
with New York law. Id. at 1469.
160. Id. at 1468. The case cited is First National Bank v. National Park
Bank, 181 A. D. 103, 168 N.Y.S. 422 (Supp. Ct. 1917). This case merely holds that
a stop payment order which came after the payor bank had made a charge to the
drawer's account but before the check had been examined for "regularity and gen-
uineness" was not paid and thus the stop order was timely. It is not a case which
shows that a stop order under prior New York law might be too late and yet the
payor bank still not be liable to the holder. Indeed, New York law still decided
priority by the payment concept, 2 COMIMSoN Rzpowr 1460 (1955); and if pay-
ment had occurred in that case, surely the payor would have been liable to the
holder and the stop payment order too late to be effective.
161. Id. at 1461, 1467.
162. Id. at 1467.
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courts spoke in terms of payment having occurred prior to, or sub-
sequent to, the receipt of a legal.
This criticism of section 4-303's use of priority language was
apparently taken to heart by the Law Revision Commission. The
only change that it recommended in section 4-303 was that the
preamble be revised to eliminate the phrase "entiled to priority"
and to substitute language making it clear that the section was
concerned only with the question of when a legal "comes too
late.'" 63
In its 1956 report, the Editorial Board recommended the
amendment of section 4-303 to its present-day form. The recom-
mendation was based on the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion's view and the realization that New York was crucial in win-
ning acceptance of the Code.16 The old preamble, phrased in
163. Section 4-303. When Items Subject to Notice, Stop-Order, Legal Process
or Set-Off; Order in Which Items May be Charged or Certified.
[As revised in Supplement No. 1.1
1. It was suggested that the intention of this section is not to estab-
lish rules of priority, or to determine questions as to the validity or effec-
tiveness of a notice, stop-order, legal process or service, except to the
extent that "priority" and effectiveness are determined by the timeliness
of receipt of the notice or stop-order, service of process, or exercise of a
set-off-i.e. that the meaning of the section is that a notice, stop-order or
legal process which, under other rules of law, would be effective to termi-
nate or suspend or otherwise modify the bank's privilege to charge the
customer's account for an item it pays, and a set-off which would, by
other rules of law, be effective to terminate or suspend the bank's duty to
its customer to pay an item, "comes too late" if the notice or order is
received, or the process is served, or the set-off is exercised, after the
bank has done one of the things specified in Section 4-303.
2. It was recommended that the language of the preamble to Section
4-303 be revised to delete the phrase "entitled to priority" and substitute
language making it clear that the section is concerned only with the
question whether the notice, etc. "comes too late." It was also recom-
mended that the text be changed to include the proposition noted in the
comment, that the time involved is the time of receipt plus the extra
time the bank needs for taking action, which it has under Section 1-
201(27) and Section 4-303. It has also recommended that reference to
"knowledge" be included.
3. Subject to item 2, Section 4-303 was approved. The Commission
also recommended that the text be changed to include "the time of re-
ceipt plus the extra time the bank needs for taking action," but that
change has no relevance to the issue discussed in this article. Id.
1 COMMISSION REPORT 429 (1956).
164. Malcolm, supra note 21, at 29.
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terms of a legal being "entiled to priority," was replaced by lan-
guage phrased in terms of a legal coming too late. The reason given
for the revision specifically acknowledges the suggestion of the
New York Law Revision Commission that the language be
changed.16
Brome's letters, and Hickey's and Killian's memoranda, show
that the Commission believed that section 4-303's omnibus clause
could end the effectiveness of a legal at an earlier stage in time
than final payment under section 4-213; yet, the Commission made
no recommendation that the omnibus clause be eliminated. The
letters and the memoranda also indicate that the Commission con-
sidered that section 4-303 could not impose liability upon a payor
bank and that it acted as a shield for the payor bank;1" no sugges-
tions to change that effect of section 4-303 were made.
The only conclusion to make then from this legislative history
is that the Commission intended the omnibus clause to end the
effectiveness of the legals prior to the completion of the posting
process under section 4-213 if the payor bank had otherwise evi-
denced the decision to pay; at the same time the payor bank would
still not be accountable to the holder until the process of posting
was actually completed under section 4-213. The Commission must
have also realized that section 4-303 would indeed act as a shield
for the payor bank, thereby protecting it from any liability to its
customer or customer's creditors if it refused to honor the legal as
a result of using section 4-303 correctly in deciding not to honor
the legal.
165. Reason:
In the 1952 Text the relative position of items, on the one hand, and
notices, stop order, legal process and setoff, on the other hand, were
stated in terms of "priority." Such formula of "priority" has evoked criti-
cism and some uncertainty. The New York Law Revision Commission
has suggested the substitution of the words "comes too late" to more
aptly describe the rule and result intended. The Revision adopts this
suggestion.
Id. (citing the 1956 REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDrroRIAL BOARD FOR THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE, at 158).
166. Mr. Malcolm's version of the Law Revision Commission's resolution dif-
fers somewhat from the recorded in note 163, supra. His version actually includes
in it a statement that section 4-303 "has no effect in itself to give the holder of a
'item' a right to payment." Malcolm, supra note 21, at 29.
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V. VIEWS OF THE Two RECORDERS OF ARTICLE 4
Fairfax Leary, Jr., and Walter E. Malcolm, the initial and final
recorders respectively of Article 4, have fortunately made known
their views on the question of whether the omnibus clause of sec-
tion 4-303(1)(d) can be used by a holder to impose accountability
on a payor bank. As stated earlier, the two recorders take opposite
views.16 7
Malcolm made his views known soon after the West Side deci-
sion. In his article, "Reflection on West Side Bank; A Draftsman's
View,""6 Malcolm unequivocally stated that section 4-303(1) was
the first or primary section that should have been considered on
the facts of West Side because it involved primarily the relative
status of an item being processed by a payor bank as against a stop
payment order.1s9 He questioned why there was only a passing ref-
erence to section 4-303 in the decision of the lower court and no
reference to it in the Supreme Court's decision.17 0
Prior to beginning his analysis of the West Side case and the
use of section 4-303, Malcolm reviewed a portion of the legislative
history 17 and stated that "no one clearly foresaw in 1956 the facts
presented by the West Side case.""'s He then said that at all times
section 4-303(1), to him, was intended to prescribe the rules as to
"who wins" between the item being processed for payment by the
payor bank and each of the four legals.173 This view held, he said,
under both the original "priority" language and the Law Revision
Commission "comes too late" language. He added that he believed
that if a bank saw fit to disregard the natural result of one of the
rules of section 4-303(1), as Marine National certainly did when it
honored Paine, Webber's stop payment order, then the bank must
bear the consequence of jumping the wrong way. Consequently, he
thought it unnecessary to insert language holding the bank "ac-
countable" under section 4-303(1)(d). Malcolm then impliedly con-
firmed the validity of the conclusions which Brome, Hickey and
167. See supra p. 284.
168. Malcolm, supra note 21.
169. Id. at 26.
170. Id.
171. See text and foot notes in "Legislative History" section of this article for
the portion of the legislative history reviewed by Malcolm.
172. See "Legislative History" section of this article for some close predic-
tions of the West Side case, all of whom Malcolm, as the recorder of Article 4,
surely saw.
173. Malcolm, supra note 21, at 30.
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Killian placed before the Law Revision Commission by concluding
that it would have been wrong to have added accountability lan-
guage in section 4-303 since a check "might win" as against one of
the "four legals" under the omnibus clause but still have not
progressed far enough to reach final payment and the accountabil-
ity stage under section 4-213(1)!17,
Although Malcolm wrote his article on the West Side case
soon after the decision was rendered, Leary spoke out first on the
question of whether the omnibus clause can be used by a holder to
impose accountability on a payor bank. Writing in 1965,175 the year
before Paine, Webber wrote the check to Byron Swidler, and some
three years before the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided West
Side, Leary noted a possibility that the differences between the
section on "final payment" before the payor bank becomes "ac-
countable for the item,'17 6 and the time when the notice or stop
order comes too late,1 77 may afford the payor bank some discretion.
Leary did not hestitate to express his opinion on a payor bank's
liability to a holder in such a situation: "It is axiomatic law that, at
least until final payment has occurred, a payor bank is under no
liability to the holder of a check.' He reasoned that section 4-
213(1) specifies the point in time when the payor bank becomes
liable, and the Code gives no indication of imposing any obligation
at an earlier date because it speaks in terms of suspending the
payor bank's "right or duty" to pay an item. The "duty," he said,
is owed to the drawer of the check and the "right" is personal to
the payor bank. Thus, "the payor bank may reverse entries and
honor a stop order, or notice of adjudicated insolvency or other
legal without liability to the owner/depositor of the check.' 7 0
Leary later confirmed his opinion of the use of the omnibus
clause in imposing liability on a payor bank in an article written
after the West Side decision.1 80 His reasons for believing that the
omnibus clause cannot impose liability on a drawee bank remained
the same. 81 He also articulated a function for section 4-303 which
174. Id. at 31.
175. Leary, supra note 10.
176. U.C.C. § 4-213(1).
177. U.C.C. § 4-303(1).
178. Leary, supra note 10, at 364.
179. Provided, of course, the payor bank has the consent of its customers. Id.
at 364-65.
180. Leary, supra note 23.
181. Id. at 929, 931.
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is quite different from that suggested by Malcolm. 8 2 The function
of section 4-303, he said, is "to settle disputes between a payor
bank, its depositor and third parties other than holders of items in
course of collection."1 83 The obvious section for a holder to use in a
dispute with the payor bank is section 4-213, the section which
Leary maintained was correctly used in West Side, a case in which
the suit was indeed by a holder.'"
VI. A LOOK AT THE RECENT CASES
Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code has been enacted
now in all states for over a decade.' Numerous state and federal
courts have relied on section 4-303(1) to resolve questions concern-
ing a contest between a check and one of the four legals. The opin-
ions have been collected for ready reference in various standard
sources."' The issue of whether a drawee bank can be held liable
or accountable by a holder under section 4-303(1)(d)'s omnibus
clause has never been specifically addressed in any of those cases.
Some of them, however, touch close to the issue; thus, they may
reflect future treatment.
Some of the cases suggest that courts will greet the issue with
a certain degree of confusion. Gibbs v. Gerberich,18 7 which ap-
peared prior to West Side, is a good example. Gerberich, the
drawer, wrote a check to Hewit, the payee, who later deposited the
check in his depositary bank. When Hewit's bank presented the
check for payment, Gerberich's payor bank charged the check to
his account. On that same day, however, a restraining order, issued
to prevent payment from the account, was served upon Gerberich's
payor bank which immediately restored the credit to Gerberich's
account. The check was apparently returned to Hewit's depositary
bank and subsequently to Hewit. The payee, Hewit, claimed in a
suit against the payor bank that the check had been "paid" within
the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code prior to the payor
bank's receipt of the restraining order; thus, the receiver under the
182. Malcolm suggested that the function of section 4-303 was to prescribe
rules as to "who wins" as between an item being processed for payment by the
payor bank and each of the four legals. Malcolm, supra note 21, at 30.
183. Leary, supra note 23, at 931.
184. Id. at 929.
185. Even Louisiana has enacted Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
186. BAnLEY, BRADY ON CHECKS §14.22, 14.23 (1979 5th ed.); 18 A.L.R. 3d
1368; 2 A. UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED §4-303 (1977).
187. 1 Ohio App. 2d 93, 203 N.E.2d 851 (1964).
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restraining order had no right to the money.
The Ohio Court of Appeals decided the case merely on
whether the posting process had been completed. After an exami-
nation of the testimony, which indeed indicated that the check had
been posted to the drawer's account, the court held that the post-
ing process had not been completed because there was no evidence
indicating the bank's decision to pay. The testimony showed that
all checks, in the ordinary course, were immediately posted after
they arrived at the payor bank; that the actual decision to pay by
the payor bank was usually made on the checks much later; and
that checks received by the payor bank were not "voided or can-
celled" until the posting run was completed. The check in question
had only been posted to the account; no decision to pay it had
been made, nor had it been voided or cancelled.
On the surface, the opinion shows no confusion whatsoever.
However, it sets out section 4-303(1)(d)'s omnibus clause and sec-
tion 4-213(1)(c) on the completion of the posting process and never
specifies whether the court used section 4-303(1) or section 4-
213(1); thus, it is unclear which Code section, or whether both sec-
tions, actually controlled.
Another case exhibiting some degree of confusion is Schultz &
Sons, Inc. v. Bank of Suffolk County.18 Unishops, Inc., drew a
check made payable to H. Schultz & Sons, Inc., the payee and
drawn on the Bank of Suffolk County. The payee deposited the
check for collection at its depositary bank which then forwarded
the check to the Federal Reserve Bank of New YorA which in turn
presented the check for payment to the payor bank, the Bank of
Suffolk County. On the same day that the payor bank received the
check it was photographed, proven and debited to Unishop's ac-
count. The following day the payor bank learned of Unishop's
bankruptcy and gave telephone notice of dishonor to the Federal
Reserve Bank. When the check was returned dishonored to the
payee, it sought a judgment against the payor bank alleging that it
had "finally paid" the check and could not later refuse payment
based on its subsequent receipt of notice of Unishop's bankruptcy.
The United States District Court considered testimony that
showed no additional processing of the check would have taken
place prior to the sending out of Unishop's monthly statement and,
rejecting any argument based on the West Side case, held that the
payor bank had indeed completed its process of posting and was
188. 439 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
332
54
ampbell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss2/2
THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE
accountable to the payee.
Like the Gibbs v. Geberich case, the Schultz opinion seems
clear on the surface. But once again the court cited both sections
4-213(1)(c) and 4-303(1)(d) without saying which was applicable or
whether both were.189
Another reaction of the courts to the issue is one of avoidance.
In Community Bank v. United States National Bank,190 the issue,
at least as the parties argued it, was squarely presented to the Su-
preme Court of Oregon. In that case, several checks were drawn on
the payor bank, the United States National Bank, and were re-
ceived by the depositary bank, Community Bank, as deposits from
some of its own customers. Community Bank presented the checks
for payment and they were processed the same night through the
payor bank's central computer. The next day, the payor bank de-
livered the checks to its branch accounts service center for filing to
its customer's individual accounts. That same day, before the
checks had been filed, the payor bank received orders to stop pay-
ment on them. The stop payment orders were honored, and the
checks were returned to the depositary bank. The depositary bank,
which held the checks, sued the payor bank, arguing that under
section 4-303(1) the stop order had come too late to affect the
bank's right or duty to pay the check to it. The payor bank, on the
other hand, argued that the governing statute was section 4-213(1)
because that section provided when a payor bank would be "ac-
countable." It cited section 4-213(1)(c) in full as one of the things
that would bring about final payment and thus accountability.
The court, however, found it unnecessary to decide whether
section 4-301(1)(d) or section 4-213(1)(c) governed the rights of the
parties. It found that the depositary bank never contended that
the payor bank had made a decision to pay in any manner other
than that by the completion of the posting process; therefore, there
was no reason for the court to decide whether the payor bank had
under the omnibus clause "otherwise evidenced by examination of
such indicated account and by its action its decision to pay" the
checks. Thus, the only issue perceived by the court was whether
the payor bank had completed the process of posting, and it noted
that the process of posting language was exactly the same under
section 4-303 and section 4-213, so it would not make any differ-
189. See the strong criticism of this opinion because of its reference to both
section 4-213(1) and section 4-303(1). Note, supra note 126, at 742.
190. 276 Or. 471, 555 P.2d 435 (1976).
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ence which section governed in this particular case -a nice, if
proper, avoidance of the issue! In the end, the court decided that
the trial court had not made a sufficient finding of facts to deter-
mine whether the process of posting had been completed and it
remanded the case.
The early Code case of Yandell v. White City Amusement
Park"' 1 is an important case. It was the first case to decide what
steps constitute those "actions" described by the omnibus clause.
In Yandell, judgment creditors sought to garnish the checking ac-
count of their judgment debtor in the payor bank. The issue in the
garnishment action was the amount of money in the judgment
debtor's (drawer's) account at the time the notice of garnishment
was served upon the payor bank. The federal district court which
heard the case relied entirely on section 4-303(1)(d)'s omnibus
clause to hold that the payor bank - when its officer penciled a
notation of the check on the drawer's ledger, stamped the checks
with a "bullseye" stamp and initialed them - had, under the om-
nibus clause, examined the account and evidenced a decision to
pay the checks. Since the payor bank's examination and decision
to pay was prior to the service of process in the garnishment ac-
tion, the court held that the payor bank was correct in paying the
holders of the checks even though the posting process was not
completed until the day after the service of the garnishment
notice.
Citizens and Peoples National Bank of Pensacola v. United
States '2 is similar to the Yandell case because it discusses what
steps constitute the "actions" under the omnibus clause. The suit
was between the Internal Revenue Service and a payor bank which
was also the payee of the check in question. A customer of the
payor bank had written a check on the bank in order to pay a note
which was payable to the order of the bank. The customer deliv-
ered a check to the payor bank to pay the balance due on the note,
but the teller, when she received the check, told the drawer that an
additional amount representing interest was still due on the note.
The drawer left that check with the teller and the next day deliv-
ered an additional check to pay for the accrued interest. At that
time, the teller took both checks and the note and put them aside
for the moment. An hour and a half later, during which time the
teller took no further action concerning the checks, an Internal
191. 232 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass. 1964).
192. 570 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Revenue Service agent served the payor bank with notice of a levy
on the customer's account. The payor bank argued that, under the
omnibus clause, it had otherwise evidenced by examination of the
customer's account, and by its action, its decision to pay the check
prior to the time of the levy. The Internal Revenue Service, on the
other hand, argued that the bank had not taken action which was
described under the omnibus clause prior to its levy. Both parties,
then, agreed that the omnibus clause controlled.
Although the lower court had decided that the payor bank had
indeed taken sufficient steps to constitute the "actions" of the
clause and thus the levy came too late, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit disagreed. It held that the only action by the
bank which was capable of objective ascertainment was the action
of the teller who physically placed the checks with the note, and it
held that the omnibus clause required some action more than that.
It also noted that the teller did not engage in any sight posting or
make any bookkeeping entries whatsoever. Therefore, the levy
came in time so that the checks should not have been paid to the
payee.
VII. CONCLUSION
As reflected by the Yandell and Citizens and Peoples Na-
tional Bank of Pensacola cases, the courts have begun to describe
what steps will constitute those "actions" decribed by the omnibus
clause. Comment 3 to section 4-303 had said that the omnibus lan-
guage was necessary to pick up other possible types of actions im-
possible to specify particularly, and now the courts are indeed
specifying on a case-by-case basis what type of action should con-
stitute the actions described under the omnibus clause.
Unfortunately, as reflected by the Gibbs, Schultz, and the
Community Bank cases, the courts are apparently not sure how
section 4-303 should be used, apparently because it so closely par-
allels the "final payment" language of section 4-213. Since the re-
corders of section 4-303 disagreed as to how it should be used, it is
not surprising that the courts are confused as well. Nevertheless,
the use of the omnibus clause is one area in which confusion need
not exist.
Based upon the first and second analysis of section 4-303's
language in this article and its extensive legislative history before
the New York Law Revision Commission, the proposition that sec-
tion 4-303's omnibus clause cannot be used by a holder as a sword
to impose liability or accountability on a payor bank seems to be
1982] 335
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correct. The corollary that section 4-303 acts as a shield in the
hands of a payor bank to protect itself against either a party whose
legal was not honored or a holder whose check was not paid would
then naturally follow.
Certainly section 4-303's pre-Code history shows a definite at-
tempt on the part of the drafters to protect the holder's rights to
payment in the face of extended time given to a payor bank to
reverse the collection process, and the omnibus clause is appar-
ently a direct result of that attempt. Malcolm, the chief advocate
of making section 4-303 a sword in the hands of the holder, can
justify his contrary proposition with nothing much more than that,
to him, the section was at all times intended to prescribe the rules
as to "who wins." Even Malcolm would not have added words of
accountability to section 4-303 precisely because of the effect of
the omnibus clasue in bringing about a cut-off of the legals prior to
final payment and accountability under section 4-213.
In fairness to Malcolm, a priority section would not ordinarily
include words which would impose liability or accountability; thus,
the exclusion of such words in drafting a section like 4-303 is logi-
cal. 93 Priority statutes, however, depend on liability or accounta-
bility existing elsewhere in favor of two or more parties against a
third party. The priority statutes then do not have to impose lia-
bility or accountability; they merely decide which party can exer-
cise its right to enforce that liability accountability at the expense
of any other party that would wish to do the same. Unfortunately
for Malcolm's contrary proposition, the two parties seeking to en-
force their rights of liability or accountability, the holder or the
issuer of the legal, have no such rights of liability or accountability
to enforce when, in the words of Brome, a bank receives a stop
payment order against a check before the check is posted but after
the bank has evidenced its decision to pay short of posting.1" If, of
course, both parties could show a right to enforce liability or ac-
countability, section 4-303 would indeed be the section to say
which one would win; that is, which one would be able to enforce
his rights of liability or accountability at the expense of the other.
There are factors that overwhelmingly point to use of the om-
nibus clause as a payor's shield, not as a holder's sword: the lack of
193. For example, the priority provisions of U.C.C. sections 9-301 and 9-312
in Article 9 on Secured Transactions contain no words imposing liability.
194. See supra p. 311.
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accountability language ' 95 in section 4-303 and the interpretation
so easily attached to the "right or duty" language in the present
preamble ' " of section 4-303, and the awareness of the New York
Law Revision Commission and Malcolm that a discretionary area
existed as a result of the omnibus clause so that a payor bank
would not be accountable to a holder and yet at the same time
would not have to obey a legal. Therefore, in a suit by a holder
who wishes to impose accountability against a payor bank, section
4-213, the final payment section, is the section which should be
used as the sword."" The payor bank, on the other hand, may use
section 4-303 as a shield to protect itself from any liability or ac-
countability9 s if it is sued in a situation involving a holder of a
check and one of the legals. Indeed, if a payor bank carefully fol-
lows the dictates of section 4-303 in honoring a legal as opposed to
a check, or vice versa, section 4-213 can never be used to impose
accountability on it. The similarity of section 4-303 to section 4-
213199 and the omnibus clause's being a separate, prior event short
of the posting process under section 4-213200 guarantees that sec-
tion 4-303 will form the perfect shield in the hands of the payor
bank.
195. See supra p. 287.
196. See supra pp. 293-95.
197. See supra p. 328.
198. If it has carefully complied with the language of section 4-303.
199. See supra p. 287.
200. See supra p. 292.
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